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It is a new dawn in the war against partisan gerrymandering.1 The practice,
which allocates voters to representative districts by partisan identity to benefit
the dominant party, is blamed for distorting electoral outcomes and making
democracy less responsive to popular will.2 Attempts to develop a test that
courts could use to reliably identify partisan gerrymandering have foundered for
decades. Tellingly, the dispositive Supreme Court case on the issue resulted in
a badly fragmented bench, with a plurality of justices denying there could ever
be a discernible standard for managing partisan gerrymandering, and the
remaining justices disagreeing over what might be a valid test.3 However,
innovative reformers claim they can provide courts with the tools to identify
politicized districting, and, where appropriate, to strike it down.4 This
movement would revolutionize the electoral landscape and solve one of the
thorniest problems in modern constitutional jurisprudence.5 There is already

1. See Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 338 (4th
Cir. 2016); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016); Shapiro v. McManus,
203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (D. Md. 2016); Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017).
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and held hearings in both Whitford and Benisek. See Gill
v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (Mem.); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017) (Mem.).
The law remains contentious at the time of the publication of this Article, however; Justice Breyer,
for example, has argued for additional briefing consolidating the various partisan gerrymandering
cases. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Benisek, 138 S. Ct. 543 (No. 17-333).
2. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law,
125 YALE L.J. 400, 416–18 (2015) (classifying partisan gerrymandering as an entrenchment
practice that operates by distorting electoral outcomes, and summarizing judicial and scholarly
perspectives); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 516 (1997) (characterizing partisan gerrymandering as “indefensibly
antimajoritarian”).
3. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004).
4. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through
the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION
L.J. 331 (2015). Stephanopoulos has served as lead counsel for Whitford, and his work on the
“efficiency gap” was cited in the case. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 958. Chen served as an expert
witness for the plaintiff in Raleigh, and the district court’s failure to adequately consider his
quantitative analysis was a central reason the 4th Circuit overturned the decision. Raleigh Wake
Citizens Ass’n., 827 F.3d at 344. This trend may receive further momentum from the growing sense
that party should be treated as a proxy for race in the defence of election law rights, including
protection against harmful districting. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or
Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and
Voting Cases 34–36 (Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law, Paper No. 2017-08, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2912403 (“Recent experience with the race
or party problem is causing me to rethink my [position] . . . . [I]t certainly seems a more sensible
approach to police partisanship in redistricting directly . . . .”).
5. This thorniness is expressed by the plurality opinion in Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims
have emerged.”).
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celebration that this may mean the end of partisan gerrymandering, ushering in
an era of fair representation in American democracy.6
This Article demonstrates that such a response to partisan gerrymandering
would misinterpret constitutional rights, infringe popular political autonomy,
and distort the conditions of democratic contestation. These conclusions derive
from the nature of party identity as instrumental and fluid.7 Voters and
politicians use parties to achieve their ultimate policy goals. Consequently,
party platforms are determined by negotiation between these political actors,
each seeking the best possible satisfaction of its preferences.8 When the
composition of a district shifts, including by partisan gerrymandering, the
various actors adapt by reconstituting their party coalitions to remain
competitive.9 Parties alter their platforms to try to secure a majority of voters in
as many districts as possible, while each voter considers which party should best
satisfy the voter’s preferences in the new political landscape. Given this
dynamic, politicized districting merely reshuffles the electorate, inducing a
round of adaptation and compromise.
Although the realities of politics are not always conducive to efficient
adaptation, politicized districting itself does not cause harm to representation.
This Article identifies two conditions that can impair adaptation, and make the
effects of partisan gerrymandering an intermediate symptom of political
pathology. The first such condition is strong first-order attachment by voters to
parties, or “partisan loyalty.” The second is clustering of voter preferences such
that voters naturally fall into antagonistic groups, or “preference bundling.”
Either of these circumstances can hamper rearrangement of party coalitions
following a partisan gerrymander, and they allow political elites to exploit the

6. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Death to the Gerrymander, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2017, 6:46 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/death_to_the_gerrymand
er_paul_smith_might_defeat_unconstitutional_redistricting.html; Ian Millhiser, One of the Biggest
Legal Guns in the Country is Coming for Partisan Gerrymandering, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 4,
2017, 5:24 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/one-of-the-biggest-legal-guns-in-the-country-is-comingfor-partisan-gerrymandering-4e6d3a0385fe#.n0qj68vet.
7. This view is commonly accepted in American political science. See, e.g., ANGUS
CAMPBELL ET AL., ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 162 (John Wiley & Sons eds., 1966)
(building on the theory of ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) to
offer a classic account of the spatial model).
8. See infra Section II.B.1.
9. Cf. Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 656 (2002)
(arguing that partisan gerrymandering can be a practice that inhibits “accountability to shifting
voter preferences”). The argument of this Article is that, at root, it is not districting that can inhibit
such accountability, but other features or conditions in an electoral dynamic. See generally Michael
S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 738–39 (2008) (observing that
“[e]lectoral competition is only one form of competition” by which political allegiances and thereby
political outcomes may be achieved).
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practice and entrench themselves.10 Both party loyalty and preference bundling,
however, are substantive political realities, and properly resolved by electoral,
rather than judicial, action.11
The reciprocal relationship between party instrumentality, political
adaptation, and substantive politics explains why the judiciary has repeatedly
misfired when advancing rights-based approaches to partisan gerrymandering.
When courts prohibit consideration of party identity in districting, they fix the
geographic constituencies of parties, and thereby artificially constrain party
identity itself. Without a clear constitutional mandate, such judicial enforcement
of the terms of popular political engagement intrusively restricts voter control
over democratic contestation.12 This effect raises deeper normative concerns
about judicial interference with democratic self-determination. Consequently,
such determinations by courts elicit the political question doctrine with regards
to the proper reach of judicial power—a doctrine which has haunted
contemporary partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence.13
The malleability of party identity and its implications for rights-based judicial
intervention have been underappreciated by scholars and legal commentators.
This Article seeks to fill this lacuna by: (1) demonstrating how political
adaptation undermines the case for litigating partisan gerrymandering; and (2)
providing a framework for understanding the democratic maladies for which
partisan gerrymandering is typically blamed. More generally, it cautions against

10. This analysis clarifies how partisan gerrymandering can be used as a tool for elite
entrenchment. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?:
Judicial Review of Partisan Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 571–72 (2004). Such problems
of elite domination pose a general obstacle to democratic rule. See Levinson & Sachs, supra note
2, at 407, 474 (describing the character of entrenchment as a practice, and observing it can either
occur through legal means or functional means, and suggesting partisan gerrymandering is a form
of functional/electoral entrenchment); BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 207 (John Dunn, Jack Goody, & Geoffrey Hawthorn eds.,1997) (describing the
problem of elite control of representative apparatus); MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES
13, 187 (U. Chi. Press ed., 2008) (describing the role of elite-driven “invisible primar[ies]” in
selecting candidates). Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our
Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845, 879 (2017) (arguing that parties no longer
have the same level of control over their apparatus, and seemingly mourning this in part, because
“parties are complex institutional actors that play an essential coordinating role in politics”).
11. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101 (Harv. U. Press ed., 1980) (stating
that the Constitution protects processes, not outcomes).
12. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1987) (“In practice, they counsel against
even that limited intervention because the available judicial remedies would almost certainly create
grave political and constitutional risks.”); Persily, supra note 9, at 667 (questioning if the benefit
conferred by gerrymandering justifies “judicial intrusion into politics,” and that such a principle
would result in extraordinarily judicial overreach).
13. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (discussing the problem of manageable
standards, partisan gerrymandering seems to evoke question of the appropriate political department
and the question of if the issue at stake is a policy determination).
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the impulse to use individual rights jurisprudence to solve deeply rooted political
crises.14
This Article begins with a brief recap of contemporary partisan
gerrymandering jurisprudence. Part I focuses on Davis v. Bandemer,15 Vieth v.
Jubelirer,16 and the most noteworthy cases currently at play in the federal
system. This Article then explores the initial challenges facing the treatment of
partisan gerrymandering as a rights violation given the flexibility of parties.
Part II turns to the structural problems facing judicial management of partisan
gerrymanders. It offers two models—an exemplary thought experiment and a
formula that aspires to capture central aspects of voter-party relations17—to
demonstrate that the reactions to partisan gerrymandering can, in principle, be
fully managed by adaptation by political actors and may prove beneficial in
certain circumstances. To support this analysis, this Article relies on methods
and interpretations used in the social sciences to predict how parties and citizens
behave when struggling for political power.
Part III considers what conditions may inhibit adaptation to partisan
gerrymandering. This Article identifies partisan loyalty and bundled preferences
as the two primary “spoilers” that can result in partisan gerrymanders harming
realization of electoral will. These “spoilers” provide an effective lens for
understanding the long-running disputes over partisan gerrymandering in both
legal scholarship and the courts.
Part IV considers rights-based understanding of party identity in the context
of the Article’s structural observations. It observes, in particular, that judicial
intervention to protect partisan identity might enforce artificial baselines for the
shifting network of voter allegiances and party platforms. Unless a substantive
analysis of voter preference is incorporated into any test, deeming partisan
gerrymandering justiciable would comprise a uniquely political type of judicial
intervention. Specifically, it would artificially fix the terms by which parties
determine their constituencies and platforms. This Article finally observes that

14. This Article is concerned with “justifiability of standard[s]” rather than “consistency of
result[s].” Rick Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 635 (2004). It is possible—and popular—to use metrical
analysis to ensure consistency of results by some objective standard; but if that objective standard
serves neither a logic of rights nor a deeper political logic, it is irrelevant.
15. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
16. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
17. This Article looks to a question posed in Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Law
and the Political Process: Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of Democratic Process, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 643, 681 (1998), by offering a model of “partisan political competition.” It has been
described by another leading election law scholar as “the finest article written in the field.” Heather
K. Gerken, Playing Cards in a Hurricane: Party Reform in an Age of Polarization, 54 HOUS. L.
REV. 911, 912 (2017). In order to do so it must make certain simplifying assumptions – particularly
through ignoring transaction costs of coalition coordination—but at least, under certain constraints,
solves a part of the puzzle.
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when courts have engaged in such aggressive forays into politics in the past, they
have frequently ended poorly.
This Article is ideological in neither its motivation nor its analysis. It is driven
by two concerns: the strange failure of lawyers and scholars to appreciate how
reallocation of voters into different districts alone cannot harm party efficacy;
and the lack of rigorous consideration regarding what judicial intervention into
substantive politics would actually entail. This Article thereby seeks to dispel
the myth that judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering will fix the crisis of
representative accountability.
I. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CHARACTER OF PARTIES
This Part offers an overview of the state of the law and describes some of the
initial challenges faced when managing partisan gerrymandering through a
rights-based framework. The responsive and instrumental traits of party identity
obscure which voter rights are harmed by partisan districting. These challenges
explain both the tangled law on partisan gerrymandering and the difficulty courts
have faced in trying to address it.
A. A Brief History of the Law of Partisan Gerrymandering
The partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence has a terse but tangled legacy. 18
It is among the most hotly contested results of the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that it should protect “fair representation.”19 Fair representation is crucial to
legitimate political process, specifically the sufficient opportunity of citizens in
a republic to determine policy outcomes through selection of representatives.20
18. The path of the case law has been well covered elsewhere. For a detailed blackletter
review, see Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 867–83 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (summarizing all
Supreme Court opinions, concurrences, and dissents directly bearing on partisan gerrymandering
from Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), through League of United Latin Am. Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)); see generally Mitchell N. Berman, Managing
Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785–809 (2005) (providing an extensive overview of
partisan gerrymandering from the Supreme Court’s first foray into substantive election law through
Vieth, with a detailed analysis of each Vieth opinion).
19. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). That partisan
gerrymandering is about principles of fair representation proved a popular academic lens for
partisan gerrymandering prior to the emergence of the “metricizing” tendency to resolve the
justiciability question—a pivot that may have occurred in response to the Vieth plurality refocusing
the analysis toward a question of lack of manageable standards. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
281 (2004); see, e.g., Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2004) (suggesting that resolving partisan
gerrymandering requires a “theory of representation”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics
in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation,” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 529 (2003) (characterizing the post-Baker election jurisprudence as
enquiring into “full and effective representation” as opposed to just procedures of vote tabulation).
20. One challenge to this inquiry is that just representation itself is a theoretically “deep”
concept requiring both a set of normative assumptions (about fair politics) and descriptive
assumptions (about human nature). See generally HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
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In the context of districting, fair representation can be infringed when the
allocation of voters to districts means each citizen’s vote does not have equal
weight in the electoral selection process.21 The most unequivocal form of such
a violation is allocation of voters to districts in unequal numbers, thereby
violating one-person one-vote.22 The other well-established form of such
violation is allocation of voters to districts by race.23 Both types of this
impairment of representation through districting can be readily classified as a
violation of Equal Protection—voters who suffer such treatment have inferior
voting rights.
In Davis v. Bandemer,24 the Court indicated that partisan gerrymandering
comprises a wrong appropriately addressed by judicial intervention, but left
unclear when courts should find it illegal. Although the Bandemer plurality
focused on such politicized districting as a wrong best understood under the vote
dilution framework, it provided little guidance as to when such vote dilution
would comprise a material violation of individual rights.25
REPRESENTATION 60–61 (U.C. Press ed., 1967) (offering an influential analysis of the role of
representation, particularly the mandate-trustee dispute); MANIN, supra note 10, at 207 (offering
historically grounded taxonomy of approaches to representation); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra
note 19, at 545 (“[Q]uestions of democratic theory are both complex and often intractable.”).
21. For a general description of how vote dilution operates, albeit oriented toward race rather
than partisanship, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671–72 (2001) (discussing that when voters are polarized around candidates
and districts are arranged to exploit this polarization, voters can be arranged into districts to have
inferior power).
22. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 613–15 (1964). See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, THE
REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 55 (U.C. Press ed., 1984) (offering an overview of the early and
foundational jurisprudence). Others have questioned if the formulaic simplicity of one-person onevote conceals unaddressed normative questions. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 19, at 529 (the
rule is formulaic); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1286 (2002) (observing that equality in number of voters per representative
does not mean equal power of votes). However, these problems exist at a higher level of abstraction
than the problem with conceptualizing of partisan gerrymandering defined in this Article.
23. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself – Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1539–41 (2002) (observing the
conflict between the Voting Right Act’s § 2 prohibition of voting practices that discriminate on the
basis of race, including vote dilution, and the mandate in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), to
satisfy strict scrutiny when using any racial classification in districting); Gerken, supra note 19.
24. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118–21.
25. The nearest thing offered by a formula in Bandemer is the following:
[P]laintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. . . .
....
. . . [A]n equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system
substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political
process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be
supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or
effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.
Id. at 127, 133.
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Eighteen years later, Vieth v. Jubelirer further scrambled the jurisprudence
through a split decision.26 A plurality of four conservative justices deemed
partisan gerrymandering to be generally non-justiciable for lack of a viable
test,27 while four liberal justices, in fragmented dissents, declared partisan
gerrymandering justiciable and the case at hand a violation, offering a diverse
set of tests to identify when gerrymandering comprised a constitutional wrong.28
The swing vote, provided by Justice Kennedy, neither found the case at hand a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause nor offered a clear standard, yet refused
to categorically find the practice of partisan gerrymandering non-justiciable.29
Further muddying the waters, Justice Kennedy suggested that an approach
focused on the First Amendment might offer a more promising path forward
than the right to an undiluted vote protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was the basis for finding districting illicit in the existing jurisprudence.30
In light of the deeply fragmented and increasingly fractious politics in the
United States, there has been a resurgent interest in partisan gerrymandering
jurisprudence, with those arguing for its illegality offering a number of
arguments in lower federal courts. In Whitford v. Gill, the case that has attracted
the most attention, the majority relied on both First Amendment associational
The plurality in Vieth observed that this “vague test” gives little guidance regarding actual
discriminatory effect. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004). Bandemer concluded that
proving intent is not especially challenging. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129. This can be traced to the
Bandemer plurality’s reliance on under informed concepts. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1326;
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 19, at 562–63.
26. For a detailed critical review of each of the Vieth opinions, see Hasen, supra note 14, and
Berman, supra note 18, at 797–809.
27. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that
political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.”).
28. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the standard of the Shaw cases should be
applied and politicized district lines invalidated when “partisan considerations [] dominate and
control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles”); Id. at 345–46 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(making a “fresh start” and innovating a test derived from the burden-shifting test used to assess
discrimination on a protected category in the employment context from McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying, at a minimum,
unjustified entrenchment “in which a party that enjoys only minority support among the populace
has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power . . . purely [as] the result of partisan
manipulation” indicative of justiciable partisan gerrymandering). As described in Section III.B.1.b
infra, the conceptions of Stevens and Souter analogize partisan identity to race; the function of this
to entire Article is to assuage Breyer’s anxieties regarding the ability of partisan gerrymandering to
be the true source of entrenchment, thus entrenchment must inevitably be attributed to “other
factors.” Id.
29. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]hile understanding
that great caution is necessary when approaching this subject, I would not foreclose all possibility
of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation
of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”).
30. Id. at 311, 314 (“That no such standard [for assessing partisan gerrymandering] has
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. . . . The First
Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases.”).
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rights and the Equal Protection Clause to deem a severe partisan gerrymander
unconstitutional discrimination.31 The district court suggested the sine qua non
of the illegality of politics in districting is an “abuse of power” marked by an
“absence of any relationship to a legitimate legislative objective,” which itself
is marked by “an excessive injection of politics” that demonstrates “an intent to
entrench a political party in power.”32
To identify where this point of excessiveness is reached, the court relied on
the novel efficiency gap metric,33 which tests the severity of a partisan
gerrymander. However, neither the court nor the efficiency gap metric adverts
to a principle theory of representation to explain why or when a particular degree
of partisanship marks illegitimate legislative action. As demonstrated passim,
the negative impacts of partisan action can be traced to substantive politics;
neither the efficiency gap nor any other proposed metric explains the
relationship between a given level of politicized districting it identifies and these
substantive political conditions.
This emphasis on quantitative analysis of politicized districting to guide legal
enquiries is a common feature of the current district court cases. This trend
suggests that a partisan districting should be illegal when certain tangible and
objective thresholds are breached.34 Other district court innovations have relied
on First Amendment rights, buttressed by Justice Kennedy’s approbation of that
path, to deem partisan gerrymandering justiciable, but have left unsettled the
precise degree of politicized districting that will render a plan illegal.35

31. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 881–84 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (discussing right to
association protected by the First Amendment and the significance of the Equal Protection Clause).
32. Id. at 885–87.
33. Id. at 862. The efficiency gap test is enumerated in Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 4, at 851 (stating that the formula is the number of parties respective “wasted” votes-defined
as those votes cast for a losing candidate, or for a victorious candidate by in excess needed for
victory-divided by the total number of votes cast in the election).
34. The court of appeals founded its reversal of a district court dismissal in Raleigh Wake
Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2016), on a conclusion
that the court had failed to properly consider expert testimony. This testimony asserted, through
use of computer simulations to randomly generate alternate districts based on traditional
redistricting criteria, that the districting at issue could only be the product of partisan bias. Cf.
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419–20 (2006) (describing Justice Kennedy’s scepticism toward
the partisan symmetry quantification standard for testing partisan gerrymandering); see also id. at
466 (describing Stevens’ approval of the same standard); see Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The
Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v.
Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007) (describing the partisan symmetry test in detail). The analysis of
Grofman and King presumes the static character of party identity, a feature more fully analysed as
undergirding the liberal view of partisan gerrymandering in Section III.B.1.b infra.
35. See Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588 (D. Md. 2016). The First Amendment
associational approach to partisan gerrymandering is addressed more thoroughly in Section
III.B.2.b infra. See also Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 881–82. Shapiro and Whitford drew in
particular from the First Amendment associational rights in politics established by Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), so this Article focuses on the associational right as the general
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B. Political Questions and Politicized Districting
The attempt to clarify the rights-based legality of partisan gerrymandering
through quantitative metrics obscures the conceptual complexity of the practice.
The overarching question is whether partisan gerrymandering is justiciable
under the political question doctrine, which requires, inter alia,36 that the Court
only resolve disputes that can be managed by “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards.”37 The conservatives in Vieth, as well as the liberal
dissenters, argued that no court has offered a unified or coherent test to
determine when partisan gerrymandering reaches the point of a constitutional
violation.38 Defenders of the justiciability of the practice have argued that since
Baker v. Carr, it has been the remit of the Court to protect the right to fair
representation.39 The deeper question, however, is not whether partisan
districting occurs, or what degree of severity makes it illegal. Rather, it is
whether such allocation of voters to districts on the basis of partisan identity
impairs “fair representation” in a manner that violates a protected right.40
Given the Court’s constitutional mandate, the justiciability query necessarily
devolves into questions about rights: is a legally protected right infringed when
voters are allocated into districts by partisan identity; and can such a right be
coherently protected by the courts? Two understandings of this voter right have
had resilience:41 the right not to suffer illegitimate, discriminatory government
action guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause and understood in the
districting context as a right to an undiluted vote;42 and the right to form
associations free from governmental interference guaranteed by the First
Amendment.43
The justiciability question could be answered in the
affirmative—and thus partisan gerrymandering regulated by the courts—if
either of these rights could be used to consistently identify when politicized
districting illegitimately impairs voters’ right to fair representation.

basis for the political right. For a full analysis of this point, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting
Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2016).
36. This is the prong of the political question doctrine that has been the crux of the debate
since Vieth. For the full test, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
37. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121–22 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–
78 (2004).
38. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279–81.
39. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 122–23; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556–57,
561–62 (1964).
40. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123.
41. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281–84. Interestingly, none of the innovations offered by the Vieth
dissents have become engines for the current round of partisan gerrymandering litigation.
42. See generally Gerken, supra note 21, at 1671; see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d
837, 929 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (observing the harm at issue is “the ability of Democrats to translate
their votes into seats”).
43. See Tokaji, supra note 35, at 3; see generally John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “WellSettled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 155 (2010).
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Both approaches require that voters’ affiliation with a political party stand as
firm and meaningful enough to validate protection by the given rights-based
framework. In the case of vote dilution, voters only suffer the harm of less
meaningful votes on the basis of partisan gerrymandering if the significance of
their votes are impaired due to their affiliation with the disadvantaged party.44
Likewise, voters only suffer associational harms on the basis of partisan
gerrymandering if their ability to form associational groups is harmed when
district lines are redrawn taking party identity into account.
If partisan gerrymandering is found justiciable, it must be because courts can
consistently identify when voters suffer as a result of being shifted among
districts on account of party affiliation. The most well-established context in
which gerrymandering inflicts a wrong is when voters are allocated to districts
on account of their race, or “racial gerrymandering.”45 In this context, however,
the deprivation is palpable: racial minorities can be fenced into geographical
distributions that are disadvantageous vis-à-vis these immutable attributes,
producing an insoluble unfairness.46
For voters to claim like harms when they are re-allocated on account of party
affiliation, however, poses a puzzle. Party affiliation is not just an attribute
around which voters coalesce, like typical wedge issues; rather, it is the very
mechanism by which voters engage in the political process to advance their
policy goals.47 A comparison to race is clarifying: racial minorities wish to avoid
persecution, so, it is tacitly assumed, they tend to form, or join, a party as a
block.48 Avoiding racial discrimination at the hands of elected representatives
is the goal; a party affiliation is a means to advance that goal. Generally stated,
a voter is harmed by deprivation of fair representation because that voter has less
than equal capacity to advance or achieve her policy goals. However, party
affiliation—and transitively, the success of any particular party—is not an
intrinsic goal.
44. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1703–04 (the injury of vote dilution falls on all voters in
the protected class, “regardless of where they live”).
45. Hasen, supra note 4, at 20.
46. In part because of the vividness of its facts, the classic expression of this may be Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 345–46 (1960), though that case relied on the Fifteenth Amendment
to invalidate the grossly discriminatory districting.
47. The opinion in Shapiro dances around this question by observing that the First
Amendment prohibits penalization on the basis of preferences, while failing to engage with the
defendants’ response that “voting patterns are dynamic.” Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d
579, 595, 598 (D. Md. 2016). Voting patterns are dynamic precisely because they are a mechanism
for realizing other preferences.
48. But see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (requiring strict scrutiny for use of race
in districting on the grounds that presuming minority voters think alike is an “impermissible racial
stereotype[]”); Gerken, supra note 21, at 1727 (observing an underlying “essentialization” problem
in treating all voters of the same race as having the same political preferences). For the conflict
entailed in the attempt to reconcile these views with preventing racial gerrymandering, see
generally Levinson, supra note 22, at 1270, 1296 (discussing the antidilution requirement and strict
scrutiny of race that create a near-insoluble conflict in districting).
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Thus, when a voter is moved from one district to another on account of party
affiliation in a manner that makes that party affiliation less effective, it is
peculiar to state that the nature of the harm is the inability of the voter to realize
her partisan identity. Rather, the nature of the harm appears to be to undermine
the organization by which the voter hopes to achieve her substantive political
goals. If the voter is worse off, it is because she cannot expect the same level of
efficacy from the coordinating institution she had previously relied upon to
express her interests.
C. The Adaptive Instrumentality of Party Identity
Yet all is fair in love and war;49 and politics is war by other means.50 Unlike
features like race or religion, citizens might be reasonably expected to abandon
their commitments to a party when it ceases to serve their ends—that is, when it
is no longer beneficial for achieving their substantive political goals.51 A citizen
might elect to do so because their once-chosen party has come to deviate from
the substantive goals desired by the citizen, or because the party, despite still
holding fast to the citizens’ values, is no longer able to effectively advance those
values, including because it has suffered a partisan gerrymander.
The judicial debate over partisan gerrymandering dances around but never
confronts the relevant question: what is the ontology of commitment to a party?52
Without taking this into account, it is impossible to determine if partisan
gerrymandering impairs “fair representation” under either a vote dilution or
49. See JOHN LYLY, EUPHUES: THE ANATOMY OF WIT, EUPHUES & HIS ENGLAND 93
(Morris William Croll & Harry Clemons eds., 1916).
50. Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 731 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans.,
1993).
51. For an analysis of this fluidity in historical practice, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER &
BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 286 (2d. ed., 2009)
(describing how social and economic disruptions can result in shifts of standing commitments and
subsequent realignment among both voters and parties). Underlying this theory of fluidity is an
interest-based theory of politics that has a hoary tradition in American politics. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (Glazier & Co. eds., 1826); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
PARTY GOVERNMENT 18 (Farrar & Rinehart eds., 2004) (describing the role of interest in party
politics).
52. Some research has suggested that voters often treat partisan affiliation as a driver of
preferences, rather than an expression of aggregated preferences. See, e.g., Richard Johnston, Party
Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?, 9 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 329, 347 (2006)
(arguing that “[p]arty identification . . . is a mover but not entirely unmoved”—in other words, that
party affiliation generally shapes ideology rather than the other way around). This conclusion
indicates that partisan identity is highly “sticky,” suggesting strong P values in the model described
in Section II.B.1 infra. But see HOWARD G. LAVINE ET AL., THE AMBIVALENT PARTISAN 19
(2012) (working from the popular rational choice framework, “people are adaptive political
decision makers who make strategic use of their cognitive resources,” and are more flexible than
Johnston would suggest); BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 51, at 286 (describing how
disruptions can result in realignment). However, the question for judicial intervention is, in a way,
less about how voters behave, than if their behavior can comprise a basis for rights, or othertheorized, intervention by the courts.
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associational rights approach. The puzzle lies in partisan affiliation’s purpose.
Party affiliation is ultimately instrumental—voters join parties in general, and
select which parties to join in particular, to realize their first-order policy
preferences:53 lowering taxes; protecting unions; preventing racial
discrimination; criminalizing abortion; and so forth. It is these granular
preferences that give voters a primary impetus for political involvement, and in
terms of elections, these preferences cannot usefully be dissolved or explained
further. Because of its instrumentality in serving these foundational preferences,
party affiliation can be characterized as a “second-order” political trait.54
When a party’s platform ceases to serve a voter’s interests—or, more
precisely, when it begins to serve a voter’s interest more poorly than the
alternative—a voter has the choice to reject the party and support its rival.55 If
party affiliation is only an instrumental mechanism for realizing a voter’s
various specific policy investments, then such affiliation should be dynamic, as
voters and parties engage in constant exchange to maximize electorate
preference satisfaction and party chances of success.56 This principle is perhaps

53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and
Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 133 (2005) (arguing parties should be treated
as loose associations designed to advance the various private actors’ agendas). For a review of the
history of the interest-coalition understanding of American politics, see JOHN GERRING, PARTY
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1828–1996 27–29 (1998). Some recent normative political theorists
have argued that partisan identity is more than instrumental. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON
THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP (Princeton U. Press
ed., 2008); RUSSELL MUIRHEAD, THE PROMISE OF PARTY IN A POLARIZED AGE (Harv. U. Press
ed., 2014); Lea Ypi, Political Commitment and the Value of Partisanship, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
601 (2016). Both Muirhead and Ypi assert that partisanship has social and normative dimensions
that an instrumental treatment of party identity sidelines. See MUIRHEAD, supra, at x
(“[P]artisanship is not a dispassionate ‘identification’ . . . it is spirited, or prideful.”); Ypi, supra, at
603 (“[P]artisanship matters . . . because certain associative practices are essential to sustaining and
nurturing [political commitment] . . . . A society without political commitment is a society of
perpetually disengaged or permanently disaffected citizens.”).
54. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1345–46.
55. This approach is of course dependent on the fact that the United States is a first-past-thepost system, and thus the meaningful option available to voters when they dislike a party is to
support the alternative, allowing American politics to generally be modelled on a one-dimensional
space. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 164. See generally James A. Gardner, Madison’s
Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 95 (2000)
(describing the nature and implications of first-past-the-post systems). Schuck, supra note 12, at
1359 argues that first-past-the-post voting undermines the “fair representation argument” offered
against partisan gerrymandering, as first-past-the-post will result in distortive over-representation
for victorious parties.
56. See, e.g., Michael Laver & Michel Schilperoord, Spatial Models of Political Competition
with Endogenous Political Parties, 362 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. 1711, 1711 (2007) (characterizing
the typical spatial model as presuming to have policy preferences and candidates as competing for
elections by offering competing package preferences). For a critique of the view that a spatial
model offers a sufficiently nuanced model of voter preference, see CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN &
LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE
RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 24–26 (Princeton U. Press ed., 2016) (reviewing the literature that
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most famously captured in the median voter theorem, but the instrumentality of
voter affiliation need not be conceived through any one specific theory.57
If voters can switch parties to serve their ultimate political ends—including
abandoning a party that is no longer capable of securing victories given a
particular configuration of voters resulting from district line drawing—then
partisan gerrymandering should pose no threat. Rather, after any particular line
drawing, voters and parties in a given district will engage in the mutual dynamic
of compromising to determine what coalition of voter preferences and candidate
platforms will be mutually most amenable to the majority of the electorate. If
this reactive dynamic occurs after any particular line drawing, and party
allegiance is purely an instrument by which voters realize their interests with
regards to partisanship, district line drawing is not a threat. The reactions of
voters will ensure that any particular district selects the candidate who is most
amenable to the majority of the voters.
Thus, partisan gerrymandering is not prospectively problematic with regards
to partisan affiliation (itself only a tool for voters), but, rather, with regards to
first-order preference satisfaction of particular groups.58 There is nothing
preventing politicized line drawing from targeting groups that have particular
first-order preferences, and “cracking” and “packing” based on those
preferences to dilute the votes of a particular block of voters.59 As described in
detail below, race can be understood as a particularly important—and explicitly
constitutionally protected—interest. If the theory of partisanship as an
instrumental vehicle for realization of substantive voter preference is accepted,
partisan gerrymandering is not problematic because of its direct harm to parties,
but because of its effective harm to popular realization of political preference. If
this effective harm necessitates that courts prohibit districting based on party
affiliation is the underlying—but never clearly expressed debate60—among the
justices, then it might be possible to adapt around partisan gerrymandering itself.
However, it is less clear when party is a firm proxy for antagonistic groupings
of preferences, that manipulative line drawing does not deeply harm realization
of the electorate’s will.
Even if partisan affiliation is wholly instrumental, there is value in parties as
settled and reliable coordinating mechanisms, and changing their constituency
and ideology imposes transaction costs.61 The parties, and the candidates who
are their standard-bearers, must satisfy a vast array of internal constituencies,
challenges the compaction of voter preference into a single variable). Despite its warts, this Article
proceeds by adopting the median voter theorem for the sake of simplicity; the same principles could
be applied, albeit with the need for a more complex approach to the modeling, where peaks of voter
preference are differently distributed.
57. See generally ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 56, at 24–26.
58. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1345–46.
59. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
60. See discussion infra Section III.B.3.
61. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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particularly in a two-party system. Through this, party identity obtains
longitudinal significance as an ideological synthesis62 and as a hard-fought yet
delicate product of negotiation and compromise.63 Rearranging the coalitions
that make a party viable is not costless,64 and these transaction costs reveal
another mechanism by which partisan gerrymandering can harm democracy.
It is precisely partisan gerrymandering’s ability to materially impair electoral
preferences that the Bandemer formula aspires to capture.65 However, the
frustrating vagueness of the Bandemer formulation reveals the difficulties in
using the existing rights-based framework to manage partisan gerrymandering.66
It is neither an immutable attribute like race, ethnicity, or gender, nor is it a
protected existential attribute like religious identity. Rather, it is an instrumental
attribute deployed in the service of deeper political desires of participants in
politics. There is, thus, an obtuseness to defending party identity as an
independent right because individuals’ interest in it is solely a function of other
goods it can advance.
More generally, the instrumentality and adaptiveness of party affiliation
complicate any claim that partisan gerrymandering impairs fair representation.
A voter who complains that he has a less powerful vote as a result of a partisan
gerrymander does not directly claim that the representative process impairs his
ability to realize first-order preferences, but, rather, claims that a central
organizational mechanism by which he implements these first-order preferences
is less effective. Voters have no right to be in a particular district, or be
guaranteed the election of the candidate they favor.67 Instead, the right is to
62. See generally supra note 51 (describing various theories that attach intrinsic normative
value to partisan attachment).
63. See Gilat Levy, A Model of Political Parties, 115 J. ECON. THEORY 250, 251 (2004)
(noting that parties are constructed by compromise between competing factions to discipline
affiliated politicians).
64. The presence of such costs is apparent in the debate over how voters process information.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C. Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party
Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464, 465
(2006). Voter ignorance would certainly complicate, and arguably exacerbate, these costs. See
Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Districting for a Low-Information Electorate, 121
YALE L.J. 1846, 1850–54 (2012).
65. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 150 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
66. Using rights to protect a fluid aspect of political identity may simply be a mismatch. In
the context of protecting against majoritarian abuse, rights tend to be absolute and thus rigid in their
political impact, rather than fluidity of votes. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE
L.J. 1286, 1324 (2012). While Levinson analyses some of the tensions facing the use of rights to
challenge racial gerrymandering, see id. at 1345, he does not address partisan gerrymandering,
which raises the additional problems. See generally Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[P]olitical parties are the dominant groups [in the political process]
. . . .”).
67. See Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (D. Md. 2016) (“[C]itizens have no
constitutional right to reside in a district in which a majority of the population shares their political
views and is likely to elect their preferred candidate.”). This is a corollary of the fact that a voter
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generally fair representation free from impermissible discrimination; in the
context of districting, this means a voter with the asserted characteristic of the
claimant must have a less meaningful vote as a function of being a member of
the group. Thus, a voter who claims that his right to fair representation is
infringed by partisan districting must ultimately demonstrate both that his ability
to realize his first-order political preferences is illegitimately impaired, and that
this impairment flows from some factor that obstructs effective partisan
reorganization.68
For partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, courts must successfully
identify when allocating voters on the basis of parties harms their right to
effective representation by preventing voters from using parties to advance firstorder preferences. The remainder of this Article explores the challenges and
contexts of this endeavor and demonstrates that controlling the impact of
partisan gerrymandering on the electorate’s realization of substantive political
preference is far trickier than it might initially appear.
II. POLITICIZED DISTRICTING AND THE SATISFACTION OF ELECTORAL
PREFERENCE
If partisan gerrymandering infringes voters’ rights, yet the purpose of party
affiliation is to facilitate the satisfaction of voter policy preferences, then
partisan gerrymandering should only be identified as a wrong where it impairs
such satisfaction. This Part begins with a simplified thought experiment that
models how the implementation of an extreme partisan gerrymander might
benefit, rather than harm, realization of the electorate’s preferences. This
suggests that it cannot be politicized districting itself that is the actual evil at
stake. This Part then proceeds to offer a more comprehensive model of how
partisan gerrymandering can change voter preference.69
A. Partisan Rearrangement and a Thought Experiment in Creative
Destruction
As this Section shows, partisan gerrymandering can benefit the realization of
the electorate’s will.70 If the actors in a polity adapt to redrawn district lines in
cannot claim vote dilution by function of the fact of merely happening to be in a district where she
cannot elect her preferred candidate. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1686 (observing the same claim
in the racial vote dilution context). Cf. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131–32 (stating that merely because
a districting reduces the likelihood a given group will be able to elect its representative does not
comprise a cognizable harm; and lack of proportional representation does not demonstrate a
districting to be unfair).
68. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133.
69. As discussed passim, this Article relies on the spatial model, and debates around and
updates to it, that have been prominent in American political science on voter and party behavior
since the 1960s.
70. For an argument that the type of gerrymander is relevant to the effect of gerrymandering,
see Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
443, 444–45 (2005). This Article, however, rejects the distinction between offensive and defensive
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a way that results in substantive voter preferences being satisfied within each
district, then partisan gerrymandering may disrupt settled patterns of allegiance
and conduct, thereby producing more preference-fulfilling governance. Partisan
gerrymandering, in effect, might achieve the “creative destruction”71 of inertial
political affiliations, resulting in dynamic rearrangement of party platforms and,
thus, better matching constituent policy preferences.72
Purely random, or, in other words, non-political, redistricting could also
beneficially disrupt existing and potentially stagnant political relationships.73
However, by placing pressure on representatives and parties to satisfy their
constituents regardless of original political allegiance, districting based on
partisan affiliation might achieve this effect robustly. Because partisan
gerrymandering deliberately targets existing political relationships, its
disruptive effects can induce change that is distinctly political, pressuring
political parties to respond to voters’ desires in a remapped constituency.
The mechanism of such transformation is preference-switching by
representatives, parties, and constituents.74 Presuming that each of these
categories of actors has clear goals—representatives to be (re-)elected, parties to
maintain as much power as possible (presumably by maximizing the number of
representatives), and constituents to have their political interests served as
accurately as possible—partisan gerrymandering could induce them to rearrange
their allegiances. It could break apart existing coalitions of interest by forcing
representatives to change their views (and, in some conditions, their partisan
allegiances), parties to change their collective platforms, and constituents to
consider what bundles of preferences they wish to be realized. The precise
character of any such reconfiguration will depend on the levels of commitment
to both particular issues and partisan loyalty by each entity, but the general
principle is that each entity wishes to ensure that it is able to realize its goals,
whatever the arrangement of voters.
A common useful principle for understanding such realignment is the median
voter theorem, which, in proceeding with the thought experiments, this Article

gerrymandering because it distinguishes factors that would obstruct realization of political
preference from any drawing of district lines.
71. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d. ed., 1942).
Others have used the phrase to describe shocks that shift partisan allegiance. BAUMGARTNER &
JONES, supra note 51, at 288.
72. Unlike the type of exogenous shocks or disruptions to party allegiance caused by socioeconomic change and identified in BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 51, at 286, the types of
shock caused by a partisan gerrymandering would relate to the constituencies of the parties
themselves. It would thus be closer to a sort of shock that would induce deliberation on standing
partisan commitments described by LAVINE ET AL., supra note 52, at 6–7, which draws on empirical
research to show that ambivalence towards partisan identity may produce fruitful political
reflection.
73. LAVINE ET AL., supra note 52, at 6–7.
74. Id.
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adopts.75 In a two-party majoritarian democracy that determines victory by the
highest vote-getter, those seeking election will seek to adopt a platform that
peels away the voter that will tip the party over the threshold of victorious
plurality.76 The result is that, all else being equal, parties should dynamically
rearrange their platforms as the electorate’s preferences change. Reality, of
course, is more complicated: parties have long-run demographic allegiances and
commitments that may inhibit the drive to seek the ideal preference-satisfying
platform for a given election; the charisma and appeal of individual
representatives will vary election to election; and voters themselves have
partisan loyalties that mean the “efficiency” upon which the median voter
theorem is premised will not be perfectly realized.77 Yet the prospective benefit
of partisan gerrymandering is that it can upset some of these inertial political
commitments.
A highly simplified instance of a model of partisan gerrymandering and voter
preference can illustrate how partisan gerrymandering can break up inertial
politics.78 Imagine a state with three single-representative districts representing
ninety-nine total voters in the state, of whom fifty-nine are Democrats (‘D’) and
forty are Republican (‘R’). Posit that under districting arranged under “natural,”
“neutral,” or “fair” principles,79 voting produced the fairly expected outcome of
two Democratic seats and one Republican seat. Further—to simplify the issue
of preferences—the parties have two issues at play, on which the parties initially
diverge: taxes (which can be either high or low); and gun rights (which can be
either pro or anti). Each party has a position on these issues prior in the initial
setup—the Democratic party is tax-high (TH) and gun-anti (GA), while
Republican party is tax-low (TL) and gun-pro (Gp). Each voter has a position on
75. The classic statement of this theory is contained in DOWNS, supra note 7. See also
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 162. For a critical review of the academic perceptions of the
median voter theorem, see generally Randall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public
Choice Theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115 (1989), and ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 56. For an
experimental test that further reviews the literature and provides an experiment that shows both the
explanatory value and some of the limits of the median voter model, see, for example, Eric J.
Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence from Referenda Voting
Patterns, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 898 (2010); Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups,
Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 576 (2012)
(reviewing the theory of and assumptions underlying the median voter theorem).
76. Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 578.
77. Id. at 572.
78. The analysis in this Section makes a number of simplifying assumptions. However, by
holding voter preferences constant and presuming that parties adapt by “competing” for voters, it
is possible to deploy fairly straightforward utility theory, see YOAV SHOHAM & KEVIN LEYTONBROWN, MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 50–60 (Cambridge U. Press ed., 2009) to add content and rigor
to the intuition expressed by Kang, supra note 70, that partisan gerrymandering may be beneficial.
Note that in this analysis, voter preferences are held constant; securing the support of enough voters
to secure political support, is the “payoff” to parties from participating in the “game.”
79. These neutral criteria are seminally laid out in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740
(1983). They include “making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the
cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.” Id. at 740.
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these issues, but must prioritize one or the other ordinally—that is, a single voter
may be any combination of high-tax or low-tax and gun-anti or gun-pro, but will
vote based on a single decisive issue. This produces four possible preference
voters: [TH | GA]; [TH | Gp]; [TL | Ga]; [TL | Gp]. However, there are eight possible
voter preference arrangements because a voter could weigh either issue more
strongly. Thus, partisan affiliation and vote will be determined by the ordinally
preferred issue.
The following chart offers a possible numerical breakdown of how issues
preferences might match partisan affiliation to reach the fifty-nine ‘D’/forty ‘R’
breakdown:
Voter prefers TH
Voter prefers TL
Voter
prefers Gp

Voter
prefers Ga

29 (prioritizes Tax – votes
‘D’)
10 (prioritizes Gun – votes
‘R’)
25 (prioritizes Tax – votes
‘D’)
5 (prioritizes Gun – votes
‘D’)

0 (prioritizes Tax –
‘R’)
20 (prioritizes Gun –
‘R’)
10 (prioritizes Tax –
‘R’)
0 (prioritizes Gun –
‘D’)

votes
votes
votes
votes

Critically, giving the greatest number of voters what they want would produce
a tax-high, gun-pro policy; sixty-nine out of ninety-nine voters prefer tax-high
to tax-low, and fifty-nine out of ninety-nine prefer gun-pro to gun-anti.
However, in the starting setup, party platforms make it impossible for the
majority of voters to be satisfied across both metrics, even as each party has a
platform that satisfies a majority of its base.80
Imagine the following allocation of voters in a pre-gerrymandered context (in
other words, districting that obeys purely “neutral” principles):
District 1:
TH
TL
Gp

11 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

5 (‘R’)

10 (‘R’)

80. Such cross-cutting party allegiances can be explained by any number of phenomena, such
as historical affiliations, accidents of past log-rolling between parties or constituent groups, or faded
cultural associations. See generally Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 573–75, 580 (offering both
hypothetical and historical conceptions of how an ideology might serve to “unif[y] disparate policy
demanders . . . in a national coalition” and enquiring how this might be applied to contemporary
politics and a general model).
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5 (‘D’)

2 (‘R’)

0 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)
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16 ‘D’: 17 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district
District 2:
TH
TL
Gp

Ga

14 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

0 (‘R’)

5 (‘R’)

10 (‘D’)

3 (‘R’)

0 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)

24 ‘D’: 8 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district
District 3:
TH
TL
Gp

Ga

4 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

5 (‘R’)

5 (‘R’)

10 (‘D’)

5 (‘R’)

5 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)

19 ‘D’: 15 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district
If, by some electoral fluke, Republicans gain control of the legislature and
aggressively redistrict to favor Republicans and harm Democrats, they might
draw new districts as follows:
New District 1:
TH
TL
Gp

Ga

8 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

10 (‘R’)

2 (‘R’)

5 (‘D’)

5 (‘R’)

3 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)

16 ‘D’: 17 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district
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TH
Gp

Ga
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TL

18 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

0 (‘R’)

5 (‘R’)

10 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

0 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)

28 ‘D’: 5 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district
New District 3:
TH
TL
Gp

Ga

3 (‘D’)

0 (‘R’)

0 (‘R’)

13 (‘R’)

10 (‘D’)

5 (‘R’)

2 (‘D’)

0 (‘D’)

15 ‘D’: 18 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district
As a result of this aggressive “cracking” and “packing” of democratic voters
(for example, the new districting has a much higher efficiency gap),81 the
Republicans control two out of three districts, despite only counting for
approximately forty percent of the electorate.
On its face, this would appear to be a classically pathological partisan
gerrymandering, discriminating against Democratic voters and diluting their
votes. Yet, the Democratic party can seize back control of a seat by making a
policy change: if the Democratic party (or, more precisely, its candidate in the
relevant election) becomes gun-pro, New District 1 becomes Democratic, as ten
Republican voters who are [TH | Gp] but whom prioritize gun policy should flip
to the Democratic party. Moreover, as described above, this actually results in
a set of policy outcomes that is better in terms of satisfying overall constituent
81. The “efficiency gaps” for the districts are as follows. There are 99 statewide votes, of
which 59 are ‘D’ and 40 are ‘R.’ Pre-gerrymandering: ‘D’ has wasted (16 (lost in district 1) + 16
(surplus in district 2) + 4 (surplus in district 3)) = 36; ‘R’ has wasted 15 (lost) + 8 (lost) + 1 (surplus)
= 24; 36 – 24 = 12 difference in wasted votes; and 12/99 = efficiency gap of 12.1% (in favor of
‘D’). This matches because ‘D’ has roughly 59% of voters but wins 67% (2 out of 3) of seats.
Post-gerrymandering, the same calculations yield ‘D’ wasted votes of 54, and ‘R’ wasted votes of
9; 54 – 9 = 45 difference in wasted votes; and 45/99 = efficiency gap of 45.5% (in favor of ‘R,’
who have won 2 out of 3 seats with only 40% of the electorate’s support). See Stephanopoulos &
McGhee, supra note 4, at 834, 852–53 (providing instructions for calculating efficiency gaps).
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preference: the now-dominant Democratic party is both tax-high and gun-pro,
as are the majority of voters. Some voters are worse off; voters who prioritize
gun-anti now have no satisfactory party, and some Democratic voters ([TH | GA])
are forced to accept only being satisfied on a single issue. Yet, the polity as a
whole is arguably better off in terms of preference satisfaction, precisely due to
the disruptive adaptation caused by the partisan gerrymander.
This model has an abstracting simplicity,82 though these assumptions serve,
in at least some respects, to defend a certain conception of human autonomy.83
Yet it reveals how a partisan gerrymander, by disrupting existing allegiances to
challenge settled political coalition, could produce stronger preference
satisfaction across the polity. As described below, where certain demographic
82. It presumes a highly simplified model of voter preference and behavior. Yet, in reality,
most voters care about a far greater number of issues; care about each issue on a spectrum rather
than as binary; likely have policy preferences bundled together into unified ideologies; and may
take active steps to shape party platforms or react badly to what they see as changes in party
platforms as “betrayals,” likely causing parties to value some “loyalist” voters more highly. It also
presumes perfect political efficiency, which is a point covered in Section III.B.2.a infra, regarding
obstructions of partisan conduct. See also Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 577 (observing two polls
on the question of whether voters are, generally, ignorant or informed).
On the other hand, it disregards the possible effects of representatives of differing levels of charisma
or appeal and ignores that party differentiation allows for agenda-setting benefits (and, thus, that
stronger party differentiation may be beneficial—the loss of any party that is gun-anti arguably
harms voter autonomy). See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1370 (describing local factors that can inflect
election results); see also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & STEIN ROKKAN, CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES,
PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 1–5 (1967) (describing the role
of structured party differentiation to enable meaningful political conflict). Some of these features
are accounted for in the complex model in Section II.B.1 infra. Moreover, realistically, the
adaptation would not consist of a single “switch” but, rather, fierce competition between parties to
adaptively shuffle between positions, in the light of other influences, including the need to ingratiate
with central wedge groups and offer platforms most satisfying to guarantee optimal political
outcomes. See generally Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 591 (citing JACOB S. HACKER AND PAUL
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 100–01 (2010)) (observing that elections and, thus, party
platforms are often dominated by wedge groups that achieve outsized status). This reflects the fact
that parties possess internal ideologies as institutions, which cannot be changed without cost vis-àvis the party as an entity. For various perspectives on this point, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., ERIC BEERBOHM, IN OUR NAME: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY 26 (Princeton
U. Press ed., 2012) (defending a deontological account of individual participation in democracy);
ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 147 (Yale U. Press ed., 2000) (stating that freedom is a central
precondition for democracy). For a terse description of the relationship between rights-based legal
protections and personal autonomy, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 601, 622 (2007). Although too vast a field to broach or argument to fully address,
it seems as though virtually no one in law—either among judges or academics—would ultimately
reject individual freedom and the ability to express choice as a central pillar of democratic practice.
It would undermine, for example, the significance of the competition theory advanced by scholars
as described in Section III.B.2.a infra; the moral value of those who attack gerrymandering on First
Amendment grounds; and the moral value of fair representation as a general principle. Cf., e.g.,
Gary King, Representation Through Legislative Redistricting: A Stochastic Model, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 787, 798 (1989) (characterizing politics as “hardly deterministic,” but presuming that voter
response to redistrict is basically mechanical).
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trends adhere, this may produce pathological outcomes—but this will be a
function of demography and political relationships, not merely of district linedrawing.84 The potential for beneficial reactions to partisan gerrymandering
expresses a central component of the argument of those who reject the
justiciability of challenges to the practice. A politically engaged, “civically
militant electorate”85 will express its preferences robustly even as district lines
are rearranged, if necessary, by adapting preferences such that parties, in order
to obtain the approval of a median voter, are induced to change their platforms.86
Indeed, this prospective adaptability of voters comprises one of the main
challenges to successful partisan gerrymanders; even without intentional
reactivity by political actors, natural demographic shifts, and the thinness
necessary to retain a disproportionate majority make securing a partisan
gerrymander a logistical challenge.87 Through their explicitly political
character, partisan gerrymanders may catalyze parties’ and voters’ reaction to a
shifting political landscape and modified voter preferences.
The possibility of a gerrymander improving preference satisfaction,
moreover, exposes the challenge of identifying how politicized districting
infringes on voter rights. Since rational party and voter adaptation in response
to the gerrymander could in some scenarios improve realization of democratic
preference, it seems as though Democratic voters cannot allege they have been
harmed by the gerrymander in a manner that is cognizable as a violation of a
protected right. The gerrymander has neither diluted their votes on the basis of
party, a rational response to the gerrymander improved the political satisfaction
of some Democratic voters, nor meaningfully impaired their ability to associate
as a party. Indeed, their party organization would play a key in coordinating any
rational adaptation. If the relevant actors fail to adapt by adjusting the party
platform, this seems to be a deeper substantive failure of political rationality—a
type of failing for which judicial intervention to quash the gerrymander would
neither be sensible nor helpful. Likewise, although the voters who absolutely
prioritize GA have been made worse off by the gerrymander, their inferior
position is a function of real politics in response to the gerrymander, rather than
any infringement of their right to political participation.88 Moreover, protecting
the GA voters through political intervention appears pathologically antidemocratic: their position is simply the one the polity rejects, and there is neither

84. See discussion supra Section I.C.
85. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
87. See CAIN, supra note 22, at 156 (describing the demographic-logistical challenges of
successfully sustaining a gerrymander over time).
88. The logical recourse for Anti-Gun voters is to advert to debate and popular discourse to
support their view. See Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 605–06 (D. Md. 2016) (Bredar,
J., dissenting) (partisan gerrymandering does not impair the ability to engage in political activism
such as debate).
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constitutional mandate nor political logic89 that makes their unpopular political
preference deserving of judicial protection.
Of course, not every arrangement of voters, or any given arrangement of
voters, from a gerrymander would actually benefit democratic preference.90 But
the point of this thought experiment is to show that it is not gerrymandering
based on partisan identity that inflicts a harm upon the electorate, in terms of
preference satisfaction; voters cannot, as a result of a partisan gerrymander,
necessarily claim their rights have been infringed. Rather, the impermissible
effect of gerrymandering based on party needs to be identified at a more granular
level that unpacks the relevant preferences those parties represent.
B. Voter Preference and Political Adaptation
The relationship between partisan gerrymandering, political adaptation, and
preference satisfaction can be helpfully generalized. This enables a more
comprehensive description of how actors might respond to politicized redrawing
of district lines.
1. The Complex Model
Most voters care about a vast array of issues with different degrees of
intensity,91 and likely have an affiliation from legacy, history, or instinct for a
particular party.92 Thus the simple model used above is primarily helpful as a

89. See ELY, supra note 11, at 76–77. They are not a “discrete and insular” minority, they
are just a group with a policy preference.
90. Other arrangements of voter preference could, of course, result in a gerrymander that does
disrupt realization of popular preference. An ‘R’ gerrymander with the following baseline polity
would simply result in grossly inferior voter preference, as two sets of policies, low taxes and progun, are advanced, despite the alternatives being preferred by the vast majority of the polity.
Voter prefers TH
Voter prefers TL
Voter prefers
Gp

Voter prefers
Ga

0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘D’)

0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’)

0 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’)

40 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’)

0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘D’)

0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’)

59 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’)

0 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’)

This, however, is due to substantive politics and is a clear (if highly simplified) example of the
“spoiler” of preference bundling. See discussion infra Part III.
91. See Benjamin I. Page & Calvin C. Jones, Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party
Loyalties and the Vote, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1078–79 (1979) (discussing the varied
influences on partisanship and their relative force on each voter).
92. Id. at 1078–79, 1081.
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thought experiment. A more accurate model93 of voter preference might be as
follows:94
𝑆 = P + ∑ I1 ∗ V1 + I2 ∗ V2 + … In ∗ Vn
S stands for a party’s “score,” P represents the voter’s partisan loyalty,95 I
represents the intensity of a preference, and V represents a preference vis-à-vis
a given party’s position on the relevant issue. The preference for a particular
party can be calculated using the same equation but replacing each 𝑉𝑥 with a
value that incorporates the difference between a voter’s “ideal” position and the
party’s actual position. A voter, in effect, has a higher value for each issue visà-vis a particular party where the differential is smaller and prefers the party with
the higher aggregate score calculated by summing up the 𝑉𝑥 ∗ 𝐼𝑥 values. A
“swing” voter is one who has “scores” for the parties that are similar, and thus
will be highly sensitive to slight shifts in party or candidate platform or attributes
that might inflect partisan loyalty.
A party’s goal is to adopt a set of positions defined by the set [𝑉1,2,...𝑛 ] such
that the majority of voters have a higher S for that party than for any available

93. This model still does not fully accommodate complexities related to voting over time, and
the vagaries of fortune. For one, it does not accommodate the various tactics and impulses that
may figure into voter decision-making. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD H. STIGLITZ, THE
REPUTATIONAL PREMIUM, A THEORY OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLICY REASONING 13–14
(Princeton U. Press ed., 2012) (reviewing the literature on how voter tendencies can influence party
and preference voting); see also Schuck, supra note 12, at 1370 (“A party’s fortunes wax and wane
over time. In a single election, its success will vary according to the office in question, the
attractiveness of particular candidates, coattail effects, salient issues, voter turnout, and many other
factors.”). For a broader account of how representation goes beyond “policy congruence,” see
GARY C. JACOBSON & JAMIE L. CARSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 243 (9th
ed. 2016). These factors likewise affect voter preference in a given election. Many of these effects
can be understood as reflected in P, and subsequently that one variable may be treated as overexplanatory.
94. As with much of the rest of the reasoning in this Article, this model is adapted from the
spatial model—that voters make a decision regarding which party to support by aggregating
preferences. The notation adopted here reflects the idea that each voter is selecting a party based
ultimately on a utility function. See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL
SCIENTISTS 23 (1994) (describing how utility functions can predict actions). For related but more
mathematically sophisticated models of voter behavior as preference aggregation, see Dan
Kovenock & Brian Roberson, Electoral Poaching and Party Identification, 20 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 275 (2008), and see also Levy, supra note 63, at 255 (offering a model of voter behavior as
preference aggregation).
95. SNIDERMAN & STIGLITZ, supra note 93, at 13–14; see also Alan Gerber & Donald P.
Green, Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 794, 797–98 (1998)
(summarizing a view on how partisan identity is formed and updated). However, as described
within Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes, in order to maintain manageable simplicity in the
model, this formula treats P as a variable of significant versatility: it includes long-term strategic
thinking related to party success or an ideology, as well as “sentiments” in political affiliation
beyond tactical affiliation.
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alternatives in as many districts as possible.96 With perfect information and in
the absence of a P, this would be trivial: a party would just offer positions that
maximize scores for a majority of voters across a maximum possible number of
districts. However, uncertainty regarding both binary voter preferences on any
given policy (uncertainty regarding the best V positions) and weighing of voter
preferences (uncertainty regarding I values) clouds this analysis. Moreover, P
value creates an obstacle to change, as voters will usually require a certain
threshold of greater preference satisfaction to defect from a party towards which
they have loyalty; and existing voters may reduce their own value of P towards
their current party if they see a party as betraying its principles by shifting values.
As is described in more detail below, the weight of P is critical in determining
the effects of a partisan gerrymander because it can induce current voters and
current parties to maintain status quo allegiances.
This model aims to capture some of the complexity involved in reacting to a
partisan gerrymander by both parties and voters.97 The risks and trade-offs of
such adaptation can take two broad forms. First, any change will impose
transaction costs in terms of P. For voters, this takes the form of having to
abandon existing allegiances in order to switch to a party that may now offer
better policy satisfaction. For parties, this involves potentially alienating
existing voters, thus reducing their P values, in the process of changing positions
to attract new voters; existing voters may identify this as a betrayal of any claim
to ideological consistency held by the party.98 Second, any change will likely
involve compromises on other issues.99 A voter who switches to a new party
will likely have to take on some new, less desirable 𝑉𝑥 that were provided by the
old party, even if the new party offers a greater overall satisfaction; this

96. Thus, P contains an element that this Article leaves to the side: institutional pressures
upon party formation. While this Article treats parties, and candidates, as ruthlessly victorymaximizing market actors, parties have internal ideologically driven agendas, which can be caused
by structural factors. See Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 589.
97. For the simplicity of the model, this treatment collapses candidate platforms into party
platforms. If the views of those such as Johnston, supra note 52, at 347 (voters largely align with
parties) or Bawn et al., supra note 75, at 571 (parties form dominant coalitions and thus select and
discipline candidates) are accepted, then this differential may be slight in any case. Moreover, if
parties are only a weakly coordinating mechanism, it is unclear why partisan gerrymandering
should matter in any case; candidates would simply obey the median voter theorem for a given
district.
98. See Page & Jones, supra note 92, at 1083 (“Surely citizens are well advised to view the
parties to some extent as governing teams, with records of past performance which bear upon future
prospects.”). In this regard, betrayal of a previously advanced position would suggest a lack of
consistency by a party. Cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 330–31 (suggesting loyalty is a pre-formed
driver, and thus that voters will adjust their views rather than shift partisan loyalty); Kovenock &
Roberson, supra note 94, at 276 (treating loyalty as a preference that can be built into
understandings of voter preference).
99. By separating out P, this model differentiates from the model offered by Kovenock &
Roberson, supra note 95, at 275, by suggesting that partisan loyalty is not merely another policy
preference; rather, it is a special characteristic.
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comprises a challenge in the absence of perfect clarity regarding preference
weighting. Likewise, parties that adjust policies to attract new voters need to
balance the prospective alienation of existing voters who preferred the old
position.
2. The Effects of Partisan Gerrymandering
Although even the complex model simplifies the relationship between parties
and voters, it is capable of illustrating the prospective benefit of partisan
gerrymandering. If it is presumed that a successful democracy maximizes
substantive voter policy preferences,100 partisan gerrymandering can facilitate
this by reallocating voters in a manner that challenges their existing solidified
preference bundles, organized by parties. When voters are no longer able to
elect their prior-preferred candidates, they may be induced to reorder their
preferences to retain political relevance. Likewise, candidates—or the parties
who select and support them—who have been gerrymandered out of a seat may
be induced to rearrange their platforms to appeal to the new set of constituents.
The rational response of both sets of harmed political actors is adaptation.101
Rational voters would recognize that continued commitment to the existing party
platform—and perhaps the existing party—will result in the voters’ continued
irrelevance and their inability to shape policy outcomes. Even if the current
party offers an optimal platform for some subset of current party voters,
continued commitment to the existing party platform would result in electoral
defeat. Voters should, thus, re-bundle their preferences,102 assessing which
preferences may be sacrificed and which must be retained to support the most
potentially victorious candidate through allegiances with voters from the
victorious party. This could be accomplished either by compromising their own
harmed party’s platform to attract marginal victorious voters or by switching to
the victorious party in exchange for the prospective opportunity to influence its
platform.103 In effect, defeated voters should abandon their current partisan
configuration, determine the compromises they are willing to make, and then
behave in a rational, if mercenary, fashion.104 The party harmed by
gerrymandering, meanwhile, would need to engage in a corollary process of

100. See Charles, supra note 83, at 608.
101. How frequently voters actually behave in such a manner varies. See Carsey & Layman,
supra note 64, at 474 (observing that voters, facing a divergence from their party on an issue, will
vary between switching party and switching issue). Cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 347 (suggesting
partisanship is the primary mover).
102. See Samuel DeCanio, Democracy, the Market, and the Logic of Social Choice, 58 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 637, 642–43 (2014) (observing that, in reality, parties offer multi-faceted “bundles” of
goods and there is imperfect expression of preference in voting, as voters can only cast a single
ballot).
103. Cf. Charles, supra note 83, at 643.
104. Id. at 638, 641.
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revising its platform to satisfy more voters.105 This would involve changing the
platform such that a different array of voters—reflecting the new composition
of the post-gerrymandered constituency in each district—would be satisfied.
In an environment without transaction costs for these rearrangements, each
given constituency would simply adapt to select an optimized candidate, and
each party would offer a candidate that sought the precise median voter in each
given district.106 However, there are transaction costs to these transitions.107 In
the complex formula, much of this transaction cost is expressed by the partisan
preference value P, which can prevent voters from rationally switching parties
and parties from ruthlessly adopting the most preference-satisfying platforms.108
The corollary cost for parties involve the challenge of coordinating across a
multi-district party as well. A change in platform would likely displease current
party members satisfied with the party’s current policies, and potentially unsettle
the coherence of the party coalitions and ideology. However, such reform of
platforms could strip away marginal voters from the victorious party, thereby
returning the harmed party to political competitiveness—particularly since
“cracked” districts usually rely upon particularly thin margins.109 Thus, a
reasonable voter from a party harmed by a gerrymander would accept some harm
to its internal platform preference satisfaction if that were the price of the voter’s
preferred party regaining power. Unless, of course, the other party’s platform
became more attractive, in which case the voter should, logically, switch party
allegiance.
Such adaptation returns vibrant competition and equilibrium of preference
satisfaction to gerrymandered districts, at the cost of the platform configuration,
and perhaps ideological integrity, of parties.110 After this type of adjustment,
political actors from the harmed parties must sacrifice the commitment to
partisan identity P in order to shift towards a set of policy positions that can
attract voters from the party that implemented the gerrymander. For voters, this
105. The reciprocal nature of voter and party adaptation is captured in Spatial Models of
Political Competition with Endogenous Political Parties. Laver & Schilperoord, supra note 56.
Voters want preferences satisfied, but they will only be satisfied if they select a winning candidate;
candidates and parties want to win, but will only win if they can successfully poach voters.
106. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 708–09.
107. Id.
108. See Gerber & Green, supra note 95, at 795 (offering, among competing views of
formation of party loyalty, one that treats it as “ballast” that “stabiliz[es] party competition amid
shifting political currents”).
109. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 153 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
CAIN, supra note 22, at 156; Schuck, supra note 12, at 1341–43.
110. One longitudinal effect this model does not address is the possibility that individual
political actors might deem it desirable to accept short-term political losses in order to retain longterm control of an internal party agenda, or avoid specific compromises. See generally JEFFREY K.
TULIS & NICOLE MELLOW, LEGACIES OF LOSING IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018). Cf. Robert Post
& Reva Siegal, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 373, 390 (2007) (describing such a phenomenon in the context of political reaction to legal
decisions).
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damage to P may involve either a willingness to embrace the dominant,
gerrymandering party in exchange for the dominant party itself shifting its
position to accommodate some preferences from the crossover voter, but at the
cost of the voter surrendering previous partisan identity; or a willingness to
accept changes to the party platform of the harmed party to try to strip away
marginal voters from the gerrymandering party.111 For parties, this may take the
form of disrupting established party dogma (that is, a certain set of Vx positions
and the coherent sense of partisan identity P) to attract crossover voters from the
party that implemented the gerrymander.
This violence to settled partisan identity might seem to be the harm of partisan
gerrymandering, but as the simple model above shows, by disrupting the settled
and potentially inertial partisan allegiances, the result can be to improve overall
preference satisfaction.112 Partisan commitment P can keep voters attached to
outmoded party platforms and obstruct the attempt to maximize voter preference
satisfaction. By discouraging inertial attachment to party identity, partisan
gerrymandering can induce parties and voters to reject partisan attachments in
favor of remaining competitive by adjusting preferences and party platforms.
C. Rights and Justiciability in the Shadow of Political Adaptation
Does the process of adaptation in response to partisan gerrymandering suggest
any justiciable constitutional wrong? Some partisan gerrymanders might
arrange voters in a manner that is substantively resistant to circumvention
through adaptation due to the preferences of voters, a type of pathology
discussed in Part III below. However, in the absence of such “spoiler”
conditions, the omission by political actors to react to redrawn district lines
seems to be a substantive political decision—or failing—and, thus, as described
more extensively in Part IV, an odd choice for judicial protection.113 If the
conclusion is that voters and parties cannot manage their responses to changing
political circumstances, then courts would effectively be intervening to protect
mainstream actors from their own political incompetence.114
The question then becomes whether rational adaptation, either adaptive or
deliberately non-adaptive, to partisan gerrymandering could comprise the basis
for a justiciable constitutional wrong. This again requires an enquiry into the
nature of party constitution and affiliation. If parties were purely coordination
mechanisms that were “refreshed” from scratch at every election, then
districting, vis-à-vis such neutral and content-free coordination mechanism,

111. See Kovenock & Roberson, supra note 94, at 288–91 (describing a model of when parties
will try to “poach” opposing voters).
112. Id. at 297 (“[V]oters pay a price for party loyalty.”). The creative destruction of partisan
gerrymandering can induce voters to reconsider this price.
113. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1379 (observing that regulating partisan gerrymandering
would comprise direct “regulation of politics”); see also discussion infra Section IV.
114. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1384.
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would inflict no harm upon voters.115 However, parties and voter partisan
commitments are not entirely mercenary marketplaces—they also reflect
organic institutional development and persistent ideological commitments
shared by multiple citizens and various blocks.116 Partisan gerrymandering
interferes with these qualities of parties, either by inducing external change or
by reducing the efficacy of parties that, even in response to changed
constituencies, do not deviate from their “naturally” evolved party programs.
Any reasonable treatment would deny a generic judicial obligation to protect
the “natural” condition or evolution of party identity.117 First, such an
intervention would require entry into a substantive morass of the nature of party
identity and its longitudinal development.118 This is both technically beyond the
ken of courts and an inappropriately substantive political question, as it requires
a judicial view regarding the correct “baseline” theory of the institutional
evolution of parties.119 Second, such an intervention would use the courts to
determine attributes of politics appropriately left to the exercise of democratic
autonomy.120 The management and content of a party’s platform is
unequivocally the responsibility of party members themselves; in order to
identify a general constitutional right infringed by modifications to this platform,
the Court would need to conclude that the judiciary plays an appropriate role in
shaping party platforms.121 This is not only perhaps judicially unmanageable,
but also prospectively undemocratic. Rather than protecting a party equally
under the law or protecting a right to association, such judicial intervention in
115. The dilution, in effect, would not cause the harm of vote dilution—reducing a party’s
political power. See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1671–72, 1677–79.
116. See id. at 1677–79.
117. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE. L.J. 31, 109–10 (1991).
118. Id. at 59–60.
119. Cf. id. at 48 (observing that critiques of interest group pluralism require a “baseline” of
acceptable influence). Elhauge’s article questions the concern with interest group pluralism
expressed in, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 29 (1985) (that the interest group capture of government functions poses a significant
threat), and argues that any challenge to interest group pluralism faces a “baselining” problem. One
could observe that partisan gerrymandering is, at a high level of abstraction, a similar problem
because the process of districting is “captured” by the dominant party. However, it is difficult to
determine the right baseline for districting: how much political influence is “too much”? Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296–97 (2004).
120. This can be seen as the synthesis of two concepts. The first is that that political outcomes
should be left to democratic process. See ELY, supra note 11, at 103 (observing that judicial
intervention is justified only when processes fail, otherwise the substance of democratic politics
should be left to democracy); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 14 (1999) (arguing that even determining the bounds of constitutionalism should be
a matter of political debate). The second is the idea that parties are powerful, and, this article
argues, adaptive players in political life. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (parties are dominant players in politics who can engage
in self-care).
121. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152–53.
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party formation would disrupt democratic autonomy.122 Although the next
section enquires whether particular exogenous circumstances could impair
partisan gerrymandering, it seems impossible to identify a general right to be
protected from partisan gerrymandering, insofar as the practice is merely another
factor in the continuous adaptation that political actors must undertake.
III. THE “SPOILERS” OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Where political actors are inhibited from responding to a politicized
redistricting by compromise and adaptation, partisan gerrymandering can inflict
significant damage upon the effective realization of popular preferences.123
These circumstances provide the strongest—though still dubious—case for
judicial intervention. This Part unpacks two categories: the robustness of a
comprehensive partisan identity; and substantive voter preference arrangements
that naturally break voters into mutually hostile blocks.124 This Part then
observes that the conflict over partisan gerrymandering within the Supreme
Court (and in the literature) revolves around these “spoiler” conditions, but the
lack of a clear analytical framework has obscured the debate.
A. Excessive Partisanship and Bundled Preferences
Two types of conditions can result in partisan gerrymandering harming
realization of the electorate’s preferences: (1) excessive partisan attachment; and
(2) strongly correlated bunching of preferences. These circumstances can divide
determinative blocks of voters into inimical and irreconcilable factions.125 The
modelling described above illustrates how each of these can render partisan
gerrymandering harmful.

122. Hints of this idea emerge from the Bandemer concurrences: Chief Justice Burger’s sense
that the Constitution dictates “responsibility for correction of such flaws [as partisan
gerrymandering lies] in the people,” and Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that parties can “fend[] for
themselves through the political process.” Id. at 144, 152. This Article adds force to their
arguments by arguing that the very nature of party formation in light of constituent autonomy
supports this analysis.
123. See Carsey & Layman, supra note 65, at 465–67.
124. For a discussion of how the spoiler conditions have evolved, and how they intersect in
complex ways (particularly in race-party interaction), see Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred
Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 872 (2016). For an analysis
and review of the question (ultimately concluding in the negative) that partisan gerrymandering
exacerbates polarization (which can be traced to either of the spoiler conditions discussed herein),
see Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666,
678 (2009).
125. Anxiety over faction has a long history in American political thought. See generally THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 50–51 (James Madison) (Glazier & Co. ed., 1826). For descriptions of the
various structural mechanisms by which the Framers attempted to manage faction, see ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15–27 (1956); Gardner, supra note 55, at 152.
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1. Strong Partisan Attachment
If enough voters have sufficiently strong attachments to party identity,
effective responses to politicized districting will become prohibitive, and
partisan gerrymandering can impair effective preference expression.126 Indeed,
the prospective benefits of partisan gerrymandering come from its ability to
induce beneficial reorganization of party positions, such that both parties
“compete” more vigorously for marginal voters.127 But if the critical mass of
prospective crossover voters has such strong partisan affiliation that it would
require profoundly dramatic changes in the gerrymandered party’s platform to
get them to defect, then the gerrymandered party will be whipsawed.128 To tempt
crossover voters, the gerrymandered party would have to change its platform so
dramatically that it might disrupt continuity and coherence in party identity,
thereby alienating its current constituency.129
The complex model would identify this as P being so strong that the
gerrymandered party would be forced to adjust a prohibitive number of 𝑉𝑥
preferences to achieve a superior S for a sufficient number of crossover voters,
particularly if such changes would harm the P of its existing constituency and
enable the opposing party to attract them through comparatively minor 𝑉𝑥
changes. In effect, by forcing the harmed party to transform its constitutive
ideology, thereby perhaps lose its original base, partisan gerrymandering places
a party that has suffered a gerrymander in an untenable position. If the P value
of the voters from the beneficiary party who must be induced to crossover is
strong enough, these first-mover costs will prevent (ex ante) or punish (ex post)
efficient adjustment.
126. As described below, the most common complaint from academics—that partisan
gerrymandering serves not to advantage one party, but to impair competition in a way that
entrenches incumbents—can be understood as a form of partisan attachment. That is, particular
incumbents are able to establish a stable base of voters who will, for loyalty-related reasons, not
oust them. Although there might be other mechanisms by which existing candidates entrench
themselves (such as use of shadow primaries, elite selection mechanisms, and so forth), these are
intrinsically unrelated to districting and ought to be managed through separate political reforms or
judicial intervention. If partisan gerrymandering is meaningful, it is because general voter approval
is still essential to politicians’ success, not because political elites have deprived the electorate of
power. Thus, insofar as partisan gerrymandering can itself benefit incumbents, it must be because
there is some preference among the electorate of a district for their existing incumbent. This Article
categorizes this as a form of partisan loyalty. If incumbents are able to exploit such partisan loyalty
to impair competition, this is a deficiency of substantive voter political competence, not a trait that
can be attributed to district line shape. See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
127. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 17, at 646.
128. See Johnston, supra note 52, at 335.
129. Some would argue that the very fact that partisan gerrymandering comprises an
exogenous shock to partisan identity, and force its disruption, might be toxic in and of itself. See,
e.g., Ypi, supra note 53, at 605 (characterizing partisan commitments as an associative commitment
like friendship; exogenous transformations like partisan gerrymandering might be seen as impairing
the virtue of such associations). Cf. LAVINE ET AL., supra note 52 (suggesting that putting partisan
preferences under stress might induce beneficial self-reflection).
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Indeed, if P is strong enough, no degree of 𝑉𝑥 adjustment will tempt enough
crossover voters, and the partisan gerrymander will simply prevent realization
of majoritarian voter preference—the type of harm to individual rights and the
democratic system that seems to be the classical concern of partisan
gerrymandering. This can be demonstrated in a trivial manner by adding
partisan loyalty to the Simple Model from Section II.A above. If P is strong
enough such that [TH | Gp] ‘R’ voters will not abandon their ‘R’ affiliation for
the added preference satisfaction of going from tax-low to tax-high, no
adjustment to the ‘D’ platform is available to correct the effects of the partisan
gerrymander, and the effect of the partisan gerrymandering is merely to result in
a minority achieving control over tax policy.
2. Correlated Preference Bundling
Adaptation to gerrymandering will also be impaired where most voters’
differing substantive preferences are highly correlated, and geography (and other
limitations) allow such correlation to be exploited in districting.130 If voters’
preference bundles are such that a party can satisfy most issues for one large
block of voters, or most issues for another, then there will be few prospective
crossover voters to which an adapting party can appeal by making marginal
modifications to its platform. Likewise, voters who wish to defect will struggle
to extract concessions from the rival party because the rival party will have
strong incentives to remain steadfast to its current constituents.
Returning to the simple model from Section II.A.1 above allows for a simple
demonstration. If all ‘D’ voters are [TH | GA] and all ‘R’ voters are [TL | Gp],
then the groups will naturally form antagonistic blocks, with parties presumably
corresponding to each view and perhaps serving as foundations to concretize the
blocks as distinct ideologies. The negotiation between parties and voters, and
rearrangement of platforms that partisan gerrymandering can inspire will not
occur. In such a situation partisan gerrymandering results in unfair outcomes,
as the preferences of the majority will not be recognized. The potential for
“creative destruction” that can redeem partisan gerrymandering is lost.131

130. The courts know this possibility. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 359 (2004) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n recent political memory, Democrats have often been concentrated in cities
while Republicans have often been concentrated in suburbs and sometimes rural areas.”); Whitford
v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 911 (W.D. Wis. 2016). Some have argued that such geographic
clustering should be used to guide the districting jurisprudence. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1384–85 (2012); see also
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1906 (2012) (arguing
that high diversity in districts may actually be problematic). Such geographic clustering, however,
is parasitic upon preference bundling; what geographic clustering does is make it easier for a
gerrymandering entity to exploit bundled preferences in districting, and thereby obstruct
geographical adaptation.
131. SCHUMPETER, supra note 72, at 83.
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Voter preferences are unlikely, in reality, to fall into such cleanly antagonistic
blocks,132 but the greater the number of preferences that are bundled together,
the more difficult it becomes for parties to make marginal adjustments to
platforms to poach marginal voters. Any such bundled position that appeals to
prospective crossover voters will displease existing party members, and in order
to convert prospective crossover voters, a party would have to change enough
positions so as to completely alienate existing party members.133
As discussed more extensively in Part IV below, preference bundling is a
danger to a unified electorate and civic politics more generally, as a polity with
such cleavages may lack civic unity and suffer the problems of faction.134
Moreover, it is likely to create a feedback loop: strong, correlated preference
differences will likely increase partisan loyalty, further dividing an electorate by
partisan identity.
3. The Historically Weightiest Spoiler: Race in America
The character of spoiler conditions is illuminated further by a comparison to
a practice so destructive that it has generated its own tangled jurisprudence:
racial districting. At its most disruptive, race can assume overriding weight, a
𝑉𝑥 that for a determinative set of voters has an 𝐼𝑥 value that dominates other
considerations, thereby arranging voters into implacably opposed factions.
American history reveals that strong racial animus can mold voters’ political
identities,135 resulting in strong and lasting P values. The Solid South was solid
because race shaped Southern political dynamics, and the 𝑉𝑥 of the racial wedge
became intertwined with the P of the Democratic party.136 As partisan positions

132. See DeCanio, supra note 102, at 644 (observing that the mismatch between the number
of policies parties must accommodate and the fact that voters can only cast a single ballot, will
result in a degree of mismatch).
133. Some would argue this occurs under particular circumstances. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER,
supra note 51 (describing a theory of realignment built around moments of deep realignment). One
way of conceiving of this is more generally is damage to a party’s “brand.” See generally Sigge
Winther Nielsen & Martin Vinæs Larsen, Party Brands and Voting, 33 ELECTORAL STUD. 153,
155 (2014) (observing that party branding influences voter behavior).
134. See DeCanio, supra note 107, at 644.
135. See BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN
EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH 51–53 (2006);
V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 4–5 (Caravelle ed., 1949).
136. The seminal account of this is magisterially described in KEY, supra note 135, at 2, 4–5.
Others have offered various updates of this account, particularly in light of the inversion of the
Solid South from Democratic to Republican. See, e.g., SHAFER & JOHNSTON, supra note 135, at
51–53 (outlining a theory of how black politics and, in particular, black enfranchisement through
legal chance in the 1960s requires a revision of Key’s account); see also M. V. HOOD III ET AL.,
THE RATIONAL SOUTHERNER 64–67 (2012) (making a similar argument). For an account that
focuses on how racial animus affected legal change, see for example, Richard L. Hasen, Race or
Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North
Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 58–60 (2014).
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evolved, the Republicans were able to realign as the party of the South137—but
the momentousness of the shift merely reinforces that P will often be particularly
intense where it can be traced to an overriding 𝑉𝑥 based in an immutable and
divisive feature.
Where an electorate’s dominant preferences are dictated by a single wedge
issue, the electorate’s party identity will resist negotiation or compromise.138 In
such circumstances, a competently executed partisan gerrymander will
irrevocably harm members of the defeated party through classic discriminatory
districting tactics.139 Where such a wedge issue dominates and partisan identity
subsequently assumes at least temporary fixedness, the perspective of the liberal
wing of the Court, which is discussed in Section III.B.i.2 below, seems
vindicated.140
Of course, partisan gerrymandering only becomes a weapon in vicious wedgegroup battle when toxic political circumstances exist.141 District line-drawing
that discriminates against a vulnerable group is parasitic upon the invidious
firmness and ardency of the dominant block.142 Were their views not so firm
and their political allegiances not so unitary, there would be opportunities for
adaptation that would alleviate the partisan districting. This, in turn, supports
the view that drawing of the districts themselves are not the problem, but, rather,
the substantive views of the electorate and their predilection to be antagonistic,
tribal, and inflexible.143
137. SHAFER & JOHNSTON, supra note 135, at 52–53.
138. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 124, at 876–77.
139. Gomillion remains the classic example of such an exercise in racial vote dilution.
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960); see generally Gerken, supra note 21. Under
U.S. federal law, of course, where such a gerrymander tracks race it will also affect racial vote
dilution, prohibited under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and would be unequivocally
illegal. However, the current Supreme Court may be eroding the efficacy of such mechanisms.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013), for example, eliminated the pre-coverage
formula of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 124, at 884
(observing that partisan gerrymandering can impair the voting power of racial minorities, and that
the ability of Section 2 of the VRA to prevent such racial effects is unclear); Hasen, supra note 4.
For an argument that voter protection should shift to concern with partisan distortion of the voting
process more generally, see Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1409 (2015).
140. The most extreme approach to this is Justice Souter’s dissent in Vieth with regards to any
group that would be the loser in such a wedge-group battle. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347
(2004) (arguing that any “vigorous hostility” by a major party against a “different but politically
coherent group”—including another major party—should be suspect).
141. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 124, at 876–80, 882.
142. See id. at 870, 902–03.
143. This sense may be reinforced by the fact that relatively oblique “exercise[s] in geometry”
is only one of the tools used to deprive minority voters of the franchise, as part of a general attack
on their political power. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639–40 (1993) (classifying racial
gerrymanders as one such tool, along with others such as literacy tests and grandfather clauses);
Levinson & Sachs, supra note 2, at 414 (observing the use of electoral entrenchment tools by the
Democratic party in the post-Reconstruction South to minimize the power of black voters). Cf.
Hasen, supra note 136, at 71–75 (arguing the Supreme Court should emphasize voter protection in
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B. The Inchoate Struggle over Spoilers in the Supreme Court and the
Literature
This analysis of spoiler conditions reveals that any harm inflicted by
politicized districting derives from underlying substantive political preferences
that make typical adaptation ineffective.144 Thus, condemnation of partisan
gerrymandering should point to the effects of spoiler conditions. This Section
demonstrates that, although the courts and literature have not framed the analysis
as such, spoiler conditions inevitably emerge as a central feature of the analysis.
1. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Spoilers
The arguments offered by the conservatives and liberals in the leading
gerrymandering cases both take as an unspoken foundational question whether
partisan identity has characteristics that allow for competitive adaptation in
response to politicized districting.145 Each side implicitly treats partisan identity
either as a fluid characteristic that cannot act as a definitive spoiler (the
conservative view), or through analogizing to race as a firm attribute that can
impair fair representation if used as the basis for redistricting, thereby facilitating
rights-based protection of voter party affiliation (the liberal view).146
a. The Conservative Treatment of Spoilers
The conservative147 jurisprudence emphasizes the reciprocal abilities of voters
to switch parties in light of a redistricting,148 and of parties to fend for themselves
in the political thicket.149 These paired opportunities lead conservatives to
general, instead of using abstruse analysis to determine if a given act of determination is driven by
race or by party).
144. See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 2, at 415–17, 424.
145. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284–88; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125–27 (1986).
146. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284–88; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125–27.
147. Although the politics of the Supreme Court have shifted since Bandemer, this Article will
refer to the anti-justiciability position as ‘conservative’ for all of the Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Furthermore, Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence will be discussed here, despite its ambiguous status.
148. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 156, 160 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); LULAC v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (rejecting a particular test for violations of fairness in
representation on the grounds that it hangs on assumptions upon shifting voter preference). See
also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 875 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (Griesbach, J., dissenting) (citing
Bandemer and Vieth to support the point that a party victimized by a gerrymander may nonetheless
convince voters who were identified by the gerrymandering party as members of that dominant
matter to flip allegiances, thereby thwarting the intentions of the gerrymander). This logic is the
functional linchpin of that provided in Parts II and III of this Article, as such conduct by both parties
and voters is central to effective representation.
149. As Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence in Bandemer:
[M]embers of the Democratic and Republican Parties cannot claim that they are a discrete
and insular group vulnerable to exclusion from the political process by some dominant
group: these political parties are the dominant groups, and the Court has offered no
reason to believe that they are incapable of fending for themselves through the political
process.
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conclude that partisan gerrymandering is unlikely to inflict constitutional
harm.150 If voters can switch parties when another party offers a platform that
satisfies more of their policy preferences,151 then a party disadvantaged by
partisan gerrymandering can simply adjust its policies to appeal to marginal
chunks of the electorate,152 thereby defeating the thin majorities that a
gerrymandering will tend to secure.153 The threat from spoiler conditions,
meanwhile, is mitigated by the asserted savviness of parties, which would
presumably manifest, inter alia, in their ability to effectively adapt to appeal to
marginal voters. The threat is also mitigated by the pliability of voters, which
would result in their receptiveness to appeals from the competing party.154
Thus, underlying the conservative position is a set of implicit assertions
regarding spoilers: that voters tend to have weak enough P values; that partisan
identities tend to be fluid enough such that political actors can readily respond
to politicized districting; and that substantive preferences are arranged such that
there is meaningful room for adjustment and political competition.155
Consequently, courts are ill-positioned to intervene because the drawing of
politicized district lines itself is not the cause of harm to representative capacity.
That depends on substantive political characteristics that conservatives do not
think courts can reliably police.156 In short, voter partisan identity is too unstable
a characteristic upon which to base a judicially enforceable right.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at
285–86 (discussing boundary line drawing as a “root-and-branch [] matter of politics,” making it
impossible to identify when there is ‘too much’ politics in legislative matters regarding politics).
150. The conservatives, in particular, seem concerned with the fact that the argument that voter
rights are impaired must be balanced against the fact that judicial nullification of a districting plan
will result in the Court fundamental political choice for the electorate. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286–88.
This idea draws on the point that districting reflect legislative decisions based on democratic
outcomes, and that for the Court to reject them is to effect rule from the bench; enforcement of a
right to partisan identity, in the conservative view, is far from costless.
151. This may be most plainly described using the example of candidate competence as a
policy preference. Id. at 287–88.
152. Id. at 287; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 160 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(discussing the importance of attracting independent voters to achieve electoral victory).
153. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 126–27 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing
political gerrymandering as a “self-limiting enterprise”). Indeed, the fundamental structural dispute
in Bandemer may be if political gerrymandering is always self-limiting (in which case the question
should never be justiciable) as opposed to self-limiting only under certain conditions (in which case
the courts will need to step in when those conditions don’t apply). Compare id. at 152 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (always self-limiting), with id. at 126–27 (not always). Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Vieth offers one of the more reflective analyses of when such practice might be
identified as self-limiting, or not. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355–60. Interestingly, the Vieth plurality
makes significantly less use of this fact, instead preferring to attack the idea that there is a right to
proportional representation for attributes such as partisan affiliation. Id. at 289–90.
154. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 159–60 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
155. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286–88.
156. See id. at 286 (stating it is impossible to say when there is “too much” politics in a
districting). See also Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152–53 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
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This supports a broader conservative confidence in the ability of political
actors—to navigate the impact of politicized line drawing. Indeed, the
conservative views of political competence, and their skepticism regarding the
justiciability of political rights based in districting, are complementary.
Conservatives assume that political competence will typically negate any
prospective harm from partisan gerrymandering, and that the judiciary is illpositioned to ascertain when spoiler conditions do exist, so courts cannot
intervene to protect voter rights against partisan gerrymandering in an organized
way.157
b. The Liberal Treatment of Spoilers
The liberal treatment of spoilers is generally, though not categorically,158
structured around an analogy of party identity to race. This parallel tends to be
embedded in liberal reasoning rather than explicitly stated;159 it would be absurd
to claim that party affiliations and platforms are as firmly set as racial identities.
Yet, liberals tend to posit a fixedness of partisan identity,160 implying that voters
(on the impossibility of eliminating politics from the districting). LULAC contains an interesting
corollary to this, related to the intent rather than effect: If, as the conservatives in Vieth assert,
partisanship is inevitable in districting and determining how much partisan intentionality is an
unmanageable line drawing exercise, then—even if one concedes prospective justiciability, as does
Kennedy—even “bloodfeud” intentionality is not enough without some tangible negative impact,
evidently missing in LULAC, at least at the moment of the election and without use of an exotic
metric such as partisan symmetry. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 456–59 (2006).
157. This statement is probably a clearer restatement of the various claims from Vieth and
Bandemer that it is impossible to know how much politics is too much. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–
89; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152–53 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. Breyer in particular avoids analogizing to race in his Vieth dissent, but as a result, his
approach has a quality of generality similar to the Bandemer plurality test. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125.
159. The Bandemer plurality offers probably the most circumspect and legally cautious
approach to this: “[T]hat the claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group, does
not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125; accord id. at 130–31. The
Powell dissent in Bandemer and the Vieth dissents tend to be more aggressive in analogizing to
race. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., dissenting) (pointing to Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983),
to suggest that any disfavoring of a “weak” community group is a constitutional violation); Vieth,
541 U.S. at 320 (pointing to dicta in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), to support the
idea that racial and political discrimination are equivalently illicit); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 337 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that a political gerrymander is as objectionable as a racial gerrymander);
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that excessive presence of both race or
partisanship can render a districting plan illicit); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 469–70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (treating party affiliation as stable and analogizing to cases on racial gerrymandering to
under discriminatory effect on Democrats).
160. See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165–66; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that discrimination by the dominant party against any “different but politically coherent
group” should be suspect). See also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2016)
(referring to “cutting out for the long-term those of a particular political affiliation”). These all
presume that a districting that is illicit because it harms a voter on account of partisan affiliation
has definitiveness in the affiliation.
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cannot shift parties readily or easily and that parties cannot make material
adjustments to their platforms to remain competitive. Without the possibility of
ready adaptation, politicized districting is a source of systemic and individual
injustice, harming collective preferences and individual voting power.
The liberals do not clearly articulate the basis of partisan identity’s similarity
to race.161 Yet, as described above, race can be the source of powerful partisan
loyalty as well as a divisive wedge issue.162 If party identity necessarily has
these traits, politicized districting will harm both the efficacy of representation
and the rights of individual voters. But such intrinsic harm is only possible if
partisanship is sufficiently firm such that adaptation cannot overcome districting
(the first spoiler condition) or if voter preferences and identities are arranged
such that voters fall into necessarily oppositional blocks (the second spoiler
condition).163 The liberal implication that party identity possesses these
characteristics is as much a substantive assumption as the conservative assertion
regarding its adaptation and fluidity.
This analysis reveals that both the conservative and liberal positions on the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering hang on foundational assumptions.
The justices are, in effect, divided on whether the Court can effectively assess
and intervene when spoiler conditions adhere.164 The ardent conservatives
suggest that the spoilers are not present with such consistent transparency to
enable judicial intervention.165 The Bandemer plurality, Breyer and, with great
tentativeness, Kennedy, suggested that when use of partisan interest in
districting is sufficiently egregious—that is, these conditions are present to a
strong enough degree—the efficacy of representation will be compromised.166
The remaining liberal justices appear willing to presume the presence of these
spoiler conditions whenever partisan self-interest dictates line drawing.167
The difficulty, however, is that the presence of these spoilers cannot be treated
as anything other than substantive political realities, and resolving the
justiciability debate can only be appropriately done through such a substantive
political inquiry. In phrasing their analysis in the traditional terms of
constitutional analysis—equal protection from vote dilution and rights to
association, all occurring in the context of district line drawing168—the justices
evade the substantive political nature of the partisan gerrymandering debate.

161. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. See Cain & Zhang, supra note 124, at 876–77.
163. For analysis on how partisan gerrymandering exacerbates polarization, which can be
traced to either of the spoiler conditions, see McCarty et al., supra note 124, at 666–78.
164. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 541.
165. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 126–27.
166. See id. at 159 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. See id. at 154.
168. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 548–50.

268

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:2

2. Spoiler Conditions and the Legal Literature
Spoiler conditions also provide a helpful perspective of innovative approaches
to election law. This Section reviews how spoilers provide a framework that can
organize and clarify the literature on partisan gerrymandering.
a. Competitive Elections as Political Markets
The most comprehensive theory of American election law is the markets-andlockups theory advanced by Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Rick
Pildes.169 They emphasized that elections should prioritize robust political
competition, a goal that can be obscured by a focus on a rigid doctrinal
framework.170 In this view, partisan gerrymandering is not an intrinsic evil;
rather, the Court should evaluate the practice in the course of a broader policing
of political accountability.171 The greatest hazard to representation is that those
who currently hold power will entrench themselves through manipulating
electoral structures and practices.172
The concern raised by these authors is the same at the heart of this Article.
Indeed, they suggested—but did not fully develop—a theory sympathetic to the
one in this Article: that partisan gerrymandering might benefit representation
through creative destruction.173 The authors focused on competition between
candidates as the sine qua non of functional elections.174 If voters know their
preferences and accordingly select representatives who will advance policies
that serve those preferences, then structures and mechanisms that impede open
candidate competition have the same character as the spoiler conditions
identified above. Just as spoiler conditions prevent effective adaptation in
response to partisan gerrymandering, misuse of political structures allow

169. A related structure-oriented approach is advanced by Gerken, supra note 19, at 530, which
emphasizes the difficulty the Supreme Court suffers in trying to interpret wrongs that go to systemic
electoral setups in individual rights terms. While Gerken does not focus on lack of competition as
the specific indicator of electoral ills, her structural approach can be understood as a related attempt
to use a high-level concept to bring order to the law. The spoiler understanding of partisan
gerrymandering fits well with her theory, insofar as it demonstrates that politicized districting
ultimately reflects substantive defects in politics rather than discrete infringement of individual
rights.
170. For the general articulation of this theory, see, for example, Issacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 17, at 648. For its specific application to partisan gerrymandering and how judicial
intervention should focus on competition rather than narrow doctrinal queries, see Issacharoff &
Karlan, supra note 10, at 570, and see generally Issacharoff, supra note 10.
171. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 10, at 575–77.
172. This implies, of course, that these authors would condemn certain clear statements the
Court has made, such as the suggestion in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 (1973), that
there is no harm where a bipartisan agreement results in proportional partisan allocation of seats.
173. Issacharoff and Karlan, supra note 10, at 541 (“[T]o the extent that the Court’s
intervention [to stop partisan gerrymandering] is prompted by claims of excessive partisanship, it
may actually encourage further reductions in political competition.”).
174. Id.
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representatives and elites to prevent elections from serving as an effective
marketplace for voter choice.
Insofar as this Article intersects the politics-as-markets theory, it argues that
partisan districting in isolation cannot be a basis for incumbent protection, as
adaptation should allow voters, as well as parties, to react to new constituencies.
This is not to say that in practice partisan gerrymanders cannot be one of the
tools in the toolkit of deviously entrenched elites, but because the lockup must
exploit some other feature of the political ecosystem—or merely be the
implementation of some deeper structural element that permits elites to deny
access to rank-and-file choice—it cannot be first-order responsible. Those
independent structural attributes are distinct from the effects of partisan
gerrymandering and, thus, conceptually parallel to spoiler conditions.
Therefore, under a lockup theory, the target should be any true competitionimpeding features of a political system, rather than partisan gerrymandering.175
Moreover, were partisan gerrymandering to be deemed justiciable, it would
require a mechanism to explain how these ills exploited partisan
gerrymandering. As discussed below, the courts should be reticent to intercede
in such substantive features particularly where party formation—part of the very
battlefield of politics—is concerned.
b. The First Amendment and Partisan Gerrymandering
Arguments that associational rights can solve the justiciability puzzle for
partisan gerrymandering face a similar challenge.176 The redrawing of district
lines does not itself obstruct the ability of citizens to engage in the formation or
coordination of political associations. If variations of preferences among voters
were homogeneously distributed, then it could have no harmful associational
effects, and the efficient adaptation process would simply produce new
coalitions.177 The presence of spoiler conditions, however, could reduce the
efficacy of associations after a politicized districting because the gerrymander
would artificially bunch voters so as to inhibit their “natural” associations.178
Yet, insofar as gerrymandering inflicts a unique harm to associations, it can be
traced to the same substantive spoiler conditions for partisan gerrymandering
generally: either strong partisan affiliations that make rejiggering associations

175. Id. at 572–76.
176. See Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 605 (D. Md. 2016) (Bredar, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the partisan gerrymandering does not infringe the type of First Amendment
associational rights that in manner germane to the type of conduct such rights are meant to protect,
because partisan gerrymandering does not impair voters’ ability to “affiliate with the party of their
choice, to vote, to run for office if they wish, and to participate in vibrant political debate wherever
they find themselves”).
177. Id. at 598.
178. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 621–
23 (2002).
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costly; or bundling of preferences that ensures voters cannot form coalitions that
are as effective as if they have been reallocated with politics in mind.
However, the associational right is not a guarantee that a given arrangement
of voters, meaning ones with strong partisan loyalty or certain blocks of
preferences, will have a protected level of political power.179 So interpreted, it
would insulate those who possess certain fluid political characteristics from the
need to engage in the adaptation process by which parties and voters fight for
power and maintain political relevance. Such protection would make the
associational right a constitutional guarantee that coalitions of voters do not need
to react to shifting circumstances that are themselves political in origin.180 It
would, thus, use the associational right to protect a given group defined only by
its political identity from the need to engage in substantive politics. Such a
protection might ultimately require defending a principle of proportional
representation, a substantive political conclusion beyond judicial mandate.181
Again, as discussed below, such judicial intervention in the very struggle that
produces political coalitions and political identities is interference with the very
process of political decision-making, and, thus, should be approached with great
suspicion.
c. Quantitative Metrics and Justiciability
Another approach to partisan gerrymandering that has been popular of late
focuses on solving the justiciability challenge by offering quantitative metrics.182
The “efficiency gap” metric advanced by Nick Stephanopolous has gained the
most traction as a manageable standard and was favorably discussed by the
majority opinion in Whitford v. Gill.183 The efficiency gap updates184 the
partisan symmetry test that was advanced—but failed to convince a majority,
including Justice Kennedy—in LULAC v. Perry.185
The analysis of this Article, however, has demonstrated that these assays
confuse a symptom of pernicious partisan gerrymandering with its necessary
179. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986) (rejecting the idea that the Court
must protect certain levels of political power for groups).
180. Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 594–95.
181. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004); see also Schuck, supra note 12, at 1350;
Persily, supra note 9, at 650 (stating that proportional representation may not necessarily be the
only just option in a first-past-the-post-system). Cf. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(agreeing generally, but adopting a softer view towards the idea that preserving proportional
representation might be a valid objective).
182. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 848–49.
183. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 920–21 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
184. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 855–57 (comparing the efficiency gap to
partisan symmetry).
185. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419–21 (2006) (describing the features and insufficiency
of the partisan symmetry test advanced by amici Gary King); but see Stephanopoulos & McGhee,
supra note 4, at 833 (summarizing the literature on partisan symmetry and describing it as “widely
accepted by scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems”).
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underlying cause. Partisan gerrymandering can, under certain conditions, cause
political harm; however, that political harm is necessarily due to substantive
political realities, and it is the Supreme Court’s decision to engage in these
substantive political realities that must guide the justiciability analysis. The
most notorious of those political realities, racial prejudice, enjoys constitutional
mandates that, inter alia, attempt to prevent it from operating as a spoiler in the
districting process.186 Numerical tests that focus on partisan identity may prove
useful as indicia of other harm, but they can do no more than offer correlative
evidence and shed little light unless it is clear what is being tested for.187
Ultimately, this can be tracked back to the nature of partisan identity as
ultimately instrumental and the need for spoiler conditions to make partisan
gerrymandering actually harmful.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN BROKEN POLITIES
If partisan gerrymandering is only a problem on account of underlying
conditions, why have litigants, the liberal branch of the Supreme Court, and
many academics persistently treated it as a malady that should be addressed as
an intrinsic evil? Given that partisan gerrymandering can be exploited as such
a tool for partisan advantage when certain circumstances exist, but that under
normal circumstances any harmful effects are neutralized by political adaptation,
ought the courts to intervene? Why has identifying an independent
constitutional wrong in the practice of partisan gerrymandering proven so
seductive if it can only be abused as a vehicle for exploiting deeper political
factors? This Part addresses these questions, focusing on the hazard of careless
judicial bushwhacking through the political thicket. If courts engage with
partisan gerrymandering—whose pathologies are better identified as
symptomatic, rather than causal, of electoral dysfunction—without sensitivity to
underlying causal ills, invalidation of legislative districting could elicit backlash
against excessive judicial intervention.188 This possibility is greatly exacerbated
by the tendency of litigants and critics to evade discussion of the underlying
pathologies that can make party-based districting problematic.
A. Fair Process, Substantive Politics, and Judicial Intervention
The features that courts unequivocally demand of a districting—that it respect
one-person one-vote and face strict scrutiny in considerations of race—reflect
either bedrock conditions of democratic fairness189 or explicit constitutional
instructions to restrict consideration of certain types of immutable
186. Hasen, supra note 4, at 9.
187. The analysis of this Article, therefore, challenges the view presented by Hasen, supra note
4, at 36, that perhaps judicial intervention to prevent racial discrimination is effectively served by
increased regulation of partisan activities during elections.
188. Schuck, supra note 12, at 1338–41, 1343–45.
189. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964) (“[A]chieving of fair and effective
representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment.”).
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characteristics.190 This Article has explored how districting by partisan identity
is conceptually and practically distinct thanks to the capacity of political actors
to adjust party identity. A question is whether courts should, nonetheless,
prohibit consideration of party identity. The most aggressive constitutional
approach to districting, provided by Justice Souter’s dissent in Vieth, would
simply prohibit attacks on any “politically coherent group whose members
engaged in bloc voting” through districting,191 in effect generalizing the equal
protection principle currently applied to race.
However, even if one adopts the Souter approach and concludes districting
should not be permitted to harm defined blocks of voters,192 there are reasons to
treat judicial protection of party identity with cautious skepticism. Unlike other
types of group commitments, party identity is an intermediary by which voters
engage with politics, rather than an end of politics itself.193 For courts to
intervene in the process by which voters make instrumental decisions on how to
advance their substantive preferences is both suspect as a democratic act and
potentially distortive of the unfolding of electorate-guided political outcomes.
This is not to say that courts cannot enter the political thicket in order to
defend process. Indeed, this was precisely the basis on which the Court entered
the thicket to protect one-person one-vote, which is a bedrock commitment of
egalitarian democratic practice.194 However, this Article has shown that partisan
gerrymandering is neither like a violation of one-person one-vote in principle,
because voters can adapt their partisan identities to retain political relevance, nor
effect, because it can prove explicitly beneficial to expression of democratic will
through creative destruction of existing coalitions.
The analysis of spoilers, of course, shows that adaptation will not always
render partisan gerrymandering harmless in terms of voter preference
satisfaction.195 Yet the spoilers themselves are the expression of substantive
political conditions.196 These conditions may justify separate types of judicial

190. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (stating that a prohibition against “redistricting
legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort
to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles
and without sufficiently compelling justification”).
191. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. It is, thus, part of the process, specifically part of the process by which voters establish
their priorities and commitments in a first-past-the-post system. See Kang, supra note 53, at 140–
41; Gardner, supra note 55, at 95.
194. Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 562–64.
195. See discussion supra Section III.A.
196. Some would argue that the current state of extreme polarization makes these conditions
particularly exigent. See generally MUIRHEAD, supra note 53; ROSENBLUM, supra note 53. Cf.
Schuck, supra note 12, at 1372 (arguing that by the mid-1980s partisan affiliation had declined,
and could be expected to decline further, a claim evidently falsified by current levels of partisan
fragmentation). Yet, polarization is precisely the type of problem of autonomous politics that courts
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intervention, particularly if there is an independent failure in democratic
process197 or if a vulnerable group’s access to politics is harmed.198 Yet, to deem
partisan gerrymandering illegal by default comprises subtle judicial intervention
in a central process by which citizens coordinate their political activities.
Judicial nullification of districting solely because districts are too partisan
constrains the terms of citizen political engagement.199
If courts intervene to shape the substantive terms of political participation, as
they would to protect party identities whether related to partisan loyalty or
preference bundling, they necessarily set a baseline200 regarding general terms
of how citizens organize politically. The resulting political coalitions are outputs
of democratic autonomy that should lie beyond the ken of judicial review.201
This point has elucidated the nature of the spoilers responsible for the
pathologies of partisan gerrymandering. Strong partisan affiliation ultimately
reflects a choice on behalf of voters, whether political actors choose to prioritize
maintaining their partisan identities— either by refusing to contemplate
negotiation to join the opposition party or by refusing to compromise on a party
platform to tempt crossover voters. If autonomy is the core of democratic
governance, this decision to avoid softening party identity in the face of
disadvantageous conditions should be treated as a free choice rather than the
basis for judicial intervention. Likewise, insofar as preference bundling reflects
the freely chosen preferences of voters, for the courts to dictate that certain
are ill-suited to manage, insofar as it requires the courts to decide optimal political arrangements
for “good” political attitudes. See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1377.
197. The idea such process failure underlies the competition theorists. See discussion supra
Section III.B.2.a; accord ELY, supra note 11, at 101 (describing the Constitution as protecting
processes rather than outcomes).
198. This is most famously captured in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). Accord ELY, supra note 11, at 75–76.
199. This challenges the argument offered by Hasen, supra note 4, at 36, which he imputes to
Issacharoff, that the ballot-access-protecting measures that should be used to prevent racial and
partisan discrimination against ballot access should be expanded to include gerrymandering,
because district composition is inherently neutral, and only becomes evil through the impact of
other ills.
200. See Elhauge, supra note 122, at 32; Levinson & Sachs, supra note 2, at 460; Charles,
supra note 84, at 660. Cf. Klarman, supra note 2, at 533–34 (observing the baseline argument of
critics of judicial involvement, but arguing that the clearly illicit motive of partisan gerrymandering
makes it susceptible to procedural solutions). If this baseline question were to be meaningfully
phrased, which well might be a precondition to generating a coherent jurisprudence of partisan
gerrymandering, it might be as follows: is there is a right to participate in a party whose ideological
program has been formed free from “exogenous” influences?
201. See ELY, supra note 11, at 101 (the Constitution protects process, not ideologies). The
factors that can make partisan gerrymandering pathological are part of the substantive outcomes of
politics, not its process. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2005). Thus, partisan gerrymandering does not
need to be policed by the courts in order to ensure “the equal freedom and independence” of citizens
that are central to democracy. Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of
Judicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327, 328, 331 (1990).
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configurations of preference bundles should have a privileged status against the
vagaries of circumstance is to intervene in the “root-and-branch”202 conflict of
democratic politics. To identify either partisan identity or preference bundling
as a quality that must be protected to ensure fair representation is to make the
category error of confusing neutral process—which can justify judicial
intervention automatically since Baker—and substantive political preference—
which requires an exceptional justification for the judicial hijacking of
democratic will.203
As this Article has already conceded (and the very term spoiler denotes),
partisan allegiance and preference bundling, as well as structural factors that
independently impair adaptation,204 can all mean that politicized redistricting
can be an intermediary for impairing democratic efficacy. In each of these cases,
however, there is a prior and independent condition that renders the districting
process pathological by impairing the adaptation process.205 Particularly, in
light of the prospective benefits of partisan gerrymandering, courts should be
leery of placing partisan identity in the category of rights that can be harmed by
districting. Rather, courts should prefer to address the underlying substantive
factors that are causally responsible for the political wrong. Indeed, the
constitutional instruction to strictly scrutinize race in districting is such an
instruction, preventing it from acting as a wedge issue that can be used to harm
minorities through districting.206
B. Justiciability and Testing for Substantive Political Harm
If courts deem some partisan gerrymanders illegal, it must not just be on the
basis that they reflect “too much” politics207 even over a prolonged period.208
Rather, to avoid invading the domain of democratic choice, the Court must tie
the nullification of a partisan gerrymander to the underlying substantive logic
202. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285 (2004).
203. Although this Article suggests that partisan gerrymandering is not an ill on the terms
suggested by reformers, its conclusions do not condemn the use of alternative districting
mechanisms, so long as such alternatives are selected by democratic process. Thus, Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677–78 (2015),
seems correctly decided, particularly given the independent mechanism arose from a ballot
initiative. However, this Article would challenge certain vindications of such mechanisms,
particularly, that they inherently improve democratic process. Others have observed aspects of
these problems with regards to redistricting commissions. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting
Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1837 (2012) (“A truly bipartisan
structure risks the prospect of stalemate and an incumbent gerrymander, but using independent
members to break partisan deadlock can feed the perception of hidden bias.”). Cf. Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 477, 489–90 (2015).
204. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.a.
205. See discussion supra Section II.A.
206. See discussion supra Section III.A.3.
207. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286, 296.
208. Id. at 300–01. This makes the efficiency gap and partisan symmetry tests insufficient by
themselves, as they must be tied to a deeper theory of legitimacy political process.
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that makes the given districting pathological. As described above, one such
possibility is that a partisan gerrymander is merely a proxy for harming another,
first-order and functionally immutable attribute, such that adaptation by the
harmed group is impossible. It is critical to differentiate strong partisan
attachment that can be attributed to such a wedge group characteristic from
purely “sentimental” attachment to a particular partisan identity, which is the
domain of political choice and, thus, inappropriate for judicial intervention.
Another possibility is that the “bundled preferences” among the electorate are
such that no meaningful adaptation can take place.209 A third possibility is that
partisan gerrymandering might be a vehicle for anti-democratic practices distinct
from a districting itself. In this case, there would be other structural factors—
such as elite domination of internal party dynamic—that make it possible to
exploit spoiler conditions districting to impair fairness.210
Any such a test would need to look at both the districting itself, as well as the
underlying political circumstances, and, thus, have far more sophistication than
the novel tests for justiciability suggested211 or implemented.212 Each of the
three possibilities (harm to an immutable attribute, bundled preferences, and use
as a tool of elite domination) identified above might be sufficient alone to
prospectively make a politicized districting illicit, but intersections of the factors
might serve to be mutually reinforcing. Courts would be required to engage in
intensive fact-finding regarding underlying political conditions, then make an
assessment regarding the impact of these political conditions upon the effect of
a districting.213 Because this would need to occur on a case-by-case basis,
litigation would impose a tremendous burden on the courts and test the limits of
judicial competence.
The complexity of the test should generate further caution regarding the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.
Intervention in partisan
gerrymandering not only requires intervention in a core process of democratic
preference formation, but also requires courts to make nuanced case-by-case

209. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.c.
210. This must ultimately the foundation of the “lockup” theory discussed by Issacharoff,
Karlan, and Pildes described passim. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.a.
211. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Shaw test should be applied
to enquire into if neutral principles were ignored); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting) (applying a
burden-shifting test derived from McDonnell); id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying
unjustified entrenchment). The Stevens and Souter tests barrel through the possibility that partisan
gerrymandering is a dependent harm; Breyer’s test allows for more fluidity, but offers little more
specificity than the Bandemer plurality’s test.
212. Whitford v. Gill, F. Supp. 3d 837, 884 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (offering a test based on “severe
impediments on the effectiveness of the votes,” yet failing to unpack upon what deeper features
that impediment subsists).
213. See Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J.
1457, 1489 (2005) (conceding that political gerrymandering “may be one of those contexts in which
the judicial branch cannot develop effective safeguards for individual rights,” though later arguing
that it should be possible to adopt some principle). Id. at 1489, 1492.
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judgments regarding local political conditions.214 The fact that courts would
need to assess political conditions heightens the risk that judging partisan
gerrymandering will cross into paternalism. Although the courts might try to
use neutral criteria to judge when specific political conditions are troubling, it is
a difficult zone to create a clear and universal test. These all evoke basic
concerns of the political question doctrine.
As partisan gerrymandering becomes a harmful practice only where it is
founded in problematic features of the electorate’s substantive political
investments, it may be safer to leave its correction to the “aroused popular
conscience”215 of voters. Nullification of partisan gerrymandering alone can
only indict underlying structural injustices.216 It would be both more transparent
and more efficacious for the Court to address such injustices directly, thereby
avoiding claims of surreptitious meddling in popular control of democratic
outcomes.
C. Unintended Consequences of Judicial Intervention
The idealized assumptions upon which this Article operates, however, must
face a challenge based in exigent political realities: parties use partisan
gerrymandering to entrench themselves, often at a cost to traditionally
disadvantaged groups.217 In light of this, theorized arguments regarding the
hypothetical capacity of voters and parties to adapt to politicized districting
ought to be set aside, and any opportunity for the courts to intervene for the sake
of justice ought to be taken.
The superficial appeal of this claim to practical necessity should not alleviate
the fragility of the case for judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering.
The legacy of the Court’s judicial intervention to prevent substantive ills, rather
than merely protect fairness of and access to process, is a dubious one. If the
adaptability of parties and partisan identity is conceded, one could characterize
judicial interdiction of partisan gerrymandering as a type of public-law

214. Id. at 1486.
215. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
216. Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
217. See Michael C. Li & Thomas P. Wolf, Court Should Outlaw Drawing of Political Maps
Based on Parties, NEWSDAY (Dec. 7, 2016, 4:50 PM), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/cou
rt-should-outlaw-drawing-of-political-maps-based-on-parties-1.12718137 (stating the two leading
figures in the fight to make partisan gerrymandering justiciable argue for the convergence between
race and party); Hasen, supra note 136, at 69 (observing that attacks on the Democratic party will
also tend to be attacks on minority voters).
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Lochnerism.218 Lochner v. New York219—now “infamous and discredited”220—
deemed legislative action taken by elected representatives that structured private
sector relations an illicit intrusion upon individual rights. This was seen as
enforcing a “prepolitical” baseline of wealth redistribution.221 Likewise, striking
down legislature-borne districting plans on the grounds that they involve
partisan gerrymanders might be identified as treating a given allocation of
districts as likewise sacrosanct.
Yet, if voters and parties can adapt to remain competitive, and explicit
constitutional protections exist to protect the concededly vulnerable racial
minorities, then judicial intervention does no more than enforce an arbitrary
baseline. Indeed, if anything, the principles of Lochner cut more strongly
against partisan gerrymandering, insofar as districting itself falls within the
realm of public electoral contestation, thus, presumably creating a reason for
doubting the need for judicial review.222 More recently, scholars have begun to
question judicial programs that impose social norms in the face of legislative
action, even those that appear more sympathetic to a progressive agenda.223
In particular, some have argued that decisions advancing racial rights, most
notably Brown v. Board of Education,224 have actually had the effect of
producing a popular political backlash.225 The modest gains generated by
Supreme Court-led action were undermined by long-simmering, and ultimately
corrosive, effects of popular resentment. Scholars have suggested this is a
broader pattern when the judiciary attempts to serve as the aggressive vanguard
of social values.226 The drawing of districts may not be the typical wedge issue
that would have such backlash; moreover, some might argue it is precisely the
type of representative self-dealing that justifies judicial intervention.227 Yet, the
structural argument of this Article is that the harm from partisan gerrymandering
must come from the substantive political commitments of an electorate. Thus,
although it may not elicit first-order backlash, like these more facially invidious
issues, it should perhaps be left as a democratic feature to be politically resolved.
Proponents of general judicial nullification of partisan gerrymandering might
argue that the Court irrevocably entered the political thicket with Baker v.
218. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequence, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390, 1397 (1994) (comparing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), to Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), insofar as that Buckley delimited government regulation of a type of
good.
219. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
220. Sunstein, supra note 218, at 1397.
221. Id.
222. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
223. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 213, at 1808.
224. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
225. See generally Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
226. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 225, at 81; Post & Siegal, supra note 110.
227. Klarman, supra note 2, at 533–34.
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Carr,228 and having taken on the mantle of ensuring fair elections through
judicial innovation, it should do so with consistency. But this ignores the basic
structural observation that undergirds this Article: districting on account of
partisan affiliation itself cannot impair individual voter political power because
of the capacity to adapt to new constituencies. The right protected in Baker
established such an individual right to equal power.229 Entry into the political
thicket through the one-person one-vote principle can be understood as both
conceptually tidy and contained within a facial reading of the Equal Protection
clause. To establish a right that is infringed by partisan gerrymandering requires
extensive innovation regarding the relationship between equality and political
participation, and only has bite with regards to underlying substantive politics.
More generally, judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering
comprises an attempt to dictate appropriate terms of political engagement by
defining the “right” conditions of party identity through elite technocratic
instruction from the Court. Yet, unless justified by reference to some legal
wrong linked to the substantive pathologies that makes partisan gerrymandering
harmful, such intervention appears to be unalloyed judicial legislation. In
nullifying politicized districting, the Court necessarily asserts that democracy
suffers from substantive ills. But rather than address these problems directly, it
attacks a practice that should be innocuous in principle. This tempts a backlash
against the very inefficacy of the judicial measures, or may simply result in
churning of district lines by judicial fiat even as the underlying political maladies
remain untouched. Indeed, if a polity truly has its conscience “seared”230 such
that it desires an apolitical districting mechanism, it has resources to ensure
neutral bodies draw district lines. An electorate can either elect representatives
who make creation of such a body a policy priority—and eject those who do not
cooperate from office—or use plebiscite mechanisms to adopt such a body.231
While more political costly or involved, such processes rely on democratic
processes to set future democratic process.
A lesson may be drawn here from the impact of the judicial regulation of racial
districting. Unlike partisanship, race has an incontrovertible legacy as a source
of material oppression of the disadvantaged. Yet, racial districting itself is not
the ill—it is the fact that certain district shapes can be used to further the racial
animus held by dominant blocks in a polity.232 Districting is regulated by the
Court to ensure that it does not become an ostensibly useful mechanism for
harming a group and, thereby, serving as the vehicle for illicit preferences.233
Yet, some have argued that the continued judicial policing of race in districting
has actually served to marginalize minority voters and impaired democratic
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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development.234 In a similar fashion, this Article suggests that judicial
intervention in partisan gerrymandering might have perverse impacts,
concealing the true problems of representation and political fairness. It, thus,
distracts activists, political entities, and the judiciary from the substantive
hazards in the political thicket that are worthy of attention.
V. CONCLUSION
Anxiety regarding the procedures of representation inevitably brushes against
concerns regarding the real outcomes of elections and policies derived from
democratic will. Judicial oversight of elections encounters this tension when
protecting “fair representation” while refraining from legislating from the bench.
This Article demonstrates that partisan gerrymandering alone does not comprise
a procedural failure that deprives voters of representative efficacy. Thus,
judicial nullification of district lines purely on the grounds of partisan
gerrymandering comprises judicial management of political outcomes.
Moreover, because party identity is a venue of political contestation that
constantly evolves in response to the electorate’s preferences, judicial
nullification of partisan gerrymandering more subtly intrudes upon voter control
of the democratic process.
This Article has shown partisan gerrymandering can only serve as an
intermediary for the expression of other problematic conditions in a democracy,
usually related to the configuration of electoral preferences or control of party
apparatus. It is these complaints that should be the source of investigation and,
if appropriate, judicial attention. To litigate partisan gerrymandering on its own
terms is to quixotically seek to solve deep structural problems by attacking
superficial symptoms. Although the tangibility and crispness of partisan
gerrymandering make it seductive as both the culprit of undesirable political
outcomes and as a practice that can be readily condemned, this lure should be
resisted.
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